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Naval Targeting:
Lawful Objects of Attack
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I. Naval Operations and Law

I

nternational law comprises both customary and treaty components}
Customary law is based upon the incident-by-incident and case-by-case
development through practical experience and an implicit acceptance by a
preponderance of governments. Treaty law is the express agreement of states
on particular subjects. International law is made and developed by
governments in order to protect governmental interests, and among these
interests is the efficient and lawful use of armed forces. Since the time of
The Prize Cases,2 decided by the u.S. Supreme Court during the Civil War,
the law of armed conflict has applied to any situation where international
armed conflict exists factually. Consequently, it is not necessary that there
be a declaration of war or a so-called technical "state of war" to make the
law applicable. This is codified in a common provision which appears in each
of the four Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims (1949)
which states that the Conventions shall apply "to all cases of declared war
or of any other armed conflict" between the state parties "even if the state
of war is not recognized by one of them. "3
The binding force of international law is stated directly in Navy
Regulations:
At all times a commander shall observe, and require his command to observe, the
principles of international law. Where necessary to fulfillment of this responsibility,
a departure from other provisions of Navy Regulations is authorized. 4

The Chief of Naval Operations has the responsibility to ensure that the
obligations of the Navy under the law of armed conflict are observed and
enforced. Alleged violations of the law of armed conflict are to be promptly
reported and thoroughly investigated. Corrective action is to be taken whenever
required. 5 At the present time officers of the Judge Advocate General's Corps
provide legal advice concerning Navy responsibilities under international law
including the law of armed conflict. In the early history of the Navy, when
The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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such legal advice was not provided, naval officers were held to a high standard
of compliance with law, both international and domestic. An example is
provided by Little v. Barreme,6 a unanimous decision of the u.s. Supreme Court
written by Chief Justice John Marshall. In the limited naval war with France,
the Congress provided by statute for the capture of vessels meeting certain
criteria engaged in commerce with France. The President issued instructions
to the Navy to capture particular vessels including, as found by the Supreme
Court, vessels not covered by the statute. Captain Little, USN, captured The
Flying Fish in compliance with the instructions of the President and sent it in
for adjudication in the prize court which determined that the capture was not
authorized by the statute. The owners of the vessel incurred damages of$8,504.00
as a result of the unlawful capture and detention and they sued Captain Little
personally for this amount. The Supreme Court, while expressing sympathy
for Captain Little, who had acted in good faith, held that he was personally
liable for the damages caused by the unlawful act. The breadth of the holding
in this case is accurately summarized in the headnote which appears in the official
U.S. Supreme Court Reports:
The commander of a ship of war of the United States, in obeying his instructions from
the President of the United States, acts at his peril: if those instructions are not strictly
warranted by law, he is answerable in damages to any person injured by their execution.

At the time that judgment was entered against Captain Little, he was
required by statute to obey the orders of his superiors without any
qualification concerning the lawful or unlawful character of the order.7 At
the present time officers of the armed services are only required to obey
"lawful" orders as prescribed by article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, entitled "Failure to obey order or regulation. " This article provides:
Any person subject to this chapter who(1) violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation;
(2) having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a member of the armed forces,
which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or
(3) is derelict in the performance of his duties; shall be punished as a court-martial may
direct. 8

The law of naval targeting is based upon three fundamental principles
which are stated in the U.S. Navy's Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operations:
1. The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.
2. It is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as such.
3. Distinctions must be made between combatants and non-combatants, to the effect
that non-combatants be spared as much as possible. 9

Because the law of armed conflict (LOAC) is an eminently practical law
which takes into account military efficiency, these basic legal principles are
consistent with the military principles of objective, mass, and economy of
force. The law requires that only militarily significant objectives be attacked,
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but it permits the use of sufficient mass to destroy those objectives. Economy
of force requires that no more effort should be directed against a military
objective than is necessary to accomplish it. In addition, the law of naval
targeting provides that all reasonable precautions must be taken to ensure
that only military objectives are targeted and that non-combatants and civilian
objects are spared as much as possible from the effects of armed conflict.
The most important treaties which are applicable to naval targeting and
lawful objects of attack or capture are the following:
Declaration of Paris Concerning Maritime Law (1856)10
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land (1907)11
Hague Convention (VI) Relating to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships
at the Outbreak of Hostilities (1907)12
Hague Convention (VII) Relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships
into War-Ships (1907)13
Hague Convention (VIII) Relative to the Laying of Automatic
Submarine Contact Mines (1907)14
Hague Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in
Time of War (1907)15
Hague Convention (X) for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the
Principles of the Geneva Convention (1907)16
Hague Convention (XI) Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard
to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War (1907)17
Process-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare (London,
1936)18
Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea
(1949)19
The listed treaties to which the United States is a state party remain in
effect and are a part of the supreme law of the land under Article VI of the
Constitution. The others, Hague Conventions VI and VII and the Declaration
of Paris, are important also because they contain some binding principles of
the customary law of naval warfare. In spite of the title of Hague Convention
IV, concerning land warfare, it states basic principles equally applicable to
naval targeting. For example, it prohibits the employment of "arms,
projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. "20 Because
of changes in the technology of naval warfare, some of the treaties are less
applicable to contemporary naval targeting than when they were written.

II. The Law Prior to the World Wars
In the historic era when privateering and piracy were widespread,
merchant ships were armed for defensive purposes. After the substantial
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abandonment of privateering and the near elimination of piracy, it became
unusual for a merchant ship to be armed. Following the development of
armored warships in the U.S. Civil War, such ships became further specialized
in offensive and defensive capabilities and were consequently very different
from merchant ships. The military weakness of the merchant ship entitled
it to special protection and the customary principle that it could not be
lawfully attacked without warning was adopted. 21 The procedures of visit
and search by warships were used in naval warfare to enable boarding officers
to determine the existence of probable grounds for capture and adjudication
in prize. The intrinsic value of merchant ships made their capture rather than
their destruction advantageous to the capturing state. The determination of
whether or not a capture was lawful under the then criteria of international
law was made by prize ~ourts. These courts were domestic courts which
applied the widely agreed upon international law criteria.22 The effective
enforcement method which ensured a high degree of uniformity in the
decisions of diverse national courts was mutuality and reciprocity. Thejudges
of each national prize court recognized that the standards it applied to enemy
merchant ships and neutral ships charged with violating the law would be
the same standards which foreign prize courts would apply to its merchant
ships.23 Elaborate rules concerning enemy and neutral ships and the cargoes
they carried were developed in the customary law. The Declaration of Paris
(1856),24 the first multilateral treaty on the law of naval warfare covered
privateering and blockades as well as the basic rules of naval economic
warfare. It provided:
1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished;
2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war;
3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture
under enemy's flag;
4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective: that is to say, maintained by
a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.

The original state parties to the Declaration of Paris were the major European
naval powers of the time and Turkey.2!! The United States was not a party
and regarded the prohibition of privateering as opposed to the interest of the
minor naval powers including itself.26 At the beginning of the Civil War the
United States attempted to become an adherent to the Declaration because
of the threat presented by the Confederate privateers, but the Declaration
was closed and it was too late for further accessions. Article 1 of the
Declaration of Paris has long been technologically obsolete, whereas article
4 has been universally accepted as customary law. Articles 2 and 3 no longer
address contemporary realities and they have been swept away by the
comprehensive economic warfare practices of each of the major belligerents
in the two W orId Wars.
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III. The Development of the Law of
Naval Targeting During the World Wars
A. Beginning of Submarine Warfare: World War I. In 1914 the potential of
the submarine warship as an efficient combatant unit, and in particular its
ability to conduct economic warfare against enemy merchant ships, was not
understood. It was assumed that submarines, like surface warships, would
follow the time-honored procedures of visit and search.27 Great Britain, as
the predominant surface naval power, instituted the long-distance blockade
and the use of the navicert system with the objective that merchant ships
including neutral ones would not be able to assist the enemy war effort.
During the First World War the traditional doctrine that enemy merchant
ships may not be the object of direct attack was eroded because of the
integration of such merchant ships into the naval forces of the enemy. In
addition, the integration of some neutral ships into the war effort of the enemy
required that a distinction be made between them and neutral ships
participating in genuine inter-neutral trade. Those neutral ships which were
participating in the Allied naval war effort were functionally no different
from participating belligerent merchant ships and, therefore, contrary to the
traditional doctrine, would appear logically to be lawful objects of attack.
The arming of British merchant ships, even though it was stated to be for
"defensive purposes" only, made it impractical for submarines to use the
traditional visit and search techniques. In the nineteenth century merchant
ships were privately owned and their voyages and cargoes were privately
controlled. During the World Wars private ownership existed nominally, but
the effective control was in the governments and it was exercised with the
single objective of advancing the war effort. 28 A further consideration which
made visit and search impossible was the employment of the British Q-ships,
which appeared to be innocent merchantmen but were actually heavily armed
warships employed to lure submarines to the surface and destroy them.29 In
addition, the adoption of the convoy system by Great Britain and the United
States in 1917 integrated merchant ships into belligerent naval operations with
the result that they became functional warships.30
Enemy warships remained lawful objects of attack without warning in the
World Wars as they have always been historically. Because of the functional
equivalency of participating merchant ships with warships, it would appear
to be logically required that they also be lawful objects of attack without
warning. This view was advanced by Germany as the preeminent submarine
naval power. In the German view the proclamation of large submarine
operational areas in the Atlantic Ocean where "unrestricted submarine
warfare" was conducted provided adequate notice to neutrals to keep their
merchant ships out of the proscribed area. 31 In a functional sense, Germany
was conducting the same comprehensive methods of economic warfare which
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were utilized by the Allied naval powers except that the German technique
was enforced by 'submarines rather than by surface warships. There is no
reason to believe that gunfire by surface warships, the ultimate sanction of
the long-distance blockade, was more humanitarian than torpedoes fired by
submarines.
The views just summarized, however logical, were decisively rejected by
Great Britain and the United Stated which claimed that the traditional
procedures of visit and search were still required of submarines. 32 The only
possible exception, in the view of the Allied naval powers, would be armed
enemy merchant ships sailing in convoys escorted by warships. International
conferences between the World Wars provided the opportunity for them to
advance their claims in international law.

B. Legal Developments Between the World Wars. During the Washington
Naval Conference (1921-1922) Great Britain proposed the abolition of the
submarine and Lord Lee made clear at the outset that in doing so "the British
Empire had no unworthy or selfish motives. "33 He continued in reference
to the submarine:
It was a weapon of murder and piracy, involving the drowning of noncombatants. It
had been used to sink passenger ships, cargo ships, and even hospital ships. TechnicaIly
the submarine was so constructed that it could not be utilized to rescue even women
and children from sinking ships and that was why he hoped that the conference would
not give it a new lease of life.34

The French, Italian, Japanese, and United States delegations joined with the
British in deploring the claimed inhumane and illegal use of submarines by
Germany in the World War but favored their retention. 35 Secretary of State
Charles Evans Hughes, the chairman of the conference, read into the record
the full report on submarines which was prepared by the Advisory Committee
of the United States delegation. It contained the following:
The United States would never desire its Navy to undertake unlimited submarine
warfare. In fact, the spirit of fair play of the people would bring about the downfaIl
of the administration which attempted to sanction its use. 36

Senator Elihu Root, a former secretary of state, proposed, in Article I of
the draft treaty concerning submarines, certain rules of naval warfare, which
were stated to be "an established part of international law." These rules
required visit and search of merchant vessels by submarines as well as by
surface warships. Article I further provided:
Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances exempt from the universal rules
above stated; and if a submarine cannot capture a merchant vessel in conformity with
these rules the existing law of nations requires it to desist from attack and from capture
and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested. 37

Article III stated the necessity for enforcement of the above rules and provided
that:
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any person in the service of any Power who shall violate any of these rules, whether
or not such person is under orders of a government superior, shall be deemed to have
violated the laws of war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of
piracy....38

The quoted provisions never became effective in spite of the support of the
other participants in the Washington Conference because initially France, and
then the others, refused to ratify the draft treaty.
Article 22 of the London Naval Treaty of 193039 contained rules applicable
to both surface and submarine warships. This 1930 treaty was terminated in
1936 except for article 22 which was continued in effect as the Proces-Verbal
Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare (1936) "without limitation of
time." It provides:
The following are accepted as established rules of International Law:
(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules
of International Law to which surface vessels are subject.
(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned,
or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine,
may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first
placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship's
boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew
is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the
presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board.40

The interpretation and application of these binding rules of law were left
to the Second World War and its aftermath. The principal ambiguities
concerning naval targeting which appear in the text are the meanings of the
terms "merchant ships," and "a merchant vessel."
C. Continuation of Submarine Warfare: World War H. Writing at the
beginning of the Second World War, Professor H. A. Smith pointed out the
dramatic difference between trading practices at the time of the Declaration
of Paris in 1856 and those in 1939:
If we are again confronted with the facts for which the Declaration laid down the law,
then that law must be applied to those facts. That is to say, if we can discover a genuine
enemy private merchant carrying on his own trade in his own way for his own profit,
then we must admit that his non-contraband goods carried in neutral ships are immune
from capture at sea. Under the conditions of the modem socialistic world, such a person
is not easily to be found .... Today he has become a disciplined individual mobilized
in the vast military organization of the totalitarian State.41

At the beginning of the Second World War, the naval belligerents on both
sides continued the practices which had been started in the First World War
and made every effort to improve upon them. Great Britain had such complete
control of the surface of the oceans that it was able to force neutral merchant
shipping to participate in the Allied war effort. Ms. Behrens, writing in the
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official British history of the Merchant Navy, described the intensification
of the system in 1940:
In the summer of 1940, the ship warrant scheme was launched, both to further the
purposes of economic warfare and in order to force neutral ships into British service
or into trades elsewhere that were held to be essential. No ship, it was ordained ... was
to be allowed any facilities in any port of the British Commonwealth unless the British
had furnished her with a warrant.42

During the Second World War the United States, first as a neutral and
then as a belligerent, cooperated fully with the British methods. 43 As a matter
of theory neutral states did not have to cooperate with the Allied naval
powers, but they realized that failure to cooperate would result in the
application of much more stringent economic warfare measures against them.
The result of this integration of neutral merchant ships into the Allied war
effort is that they became lawful objects of attack like similarly employed
belligerent merchant ships.44 Only those few neutral merchant ships engaged
in genuine inter-neutral trade were immune from attack.
The British Defense of Merchant Shipping Handbook (1938) was distributed to
the masters of the Merchant Navy ships in 1938. On the subject of "conditions
under which fire may be opened" the Handbook stated that if the enemy adopts
a policy of sinking merchant ships without warning
it will then be permissible to open fire on an enemy surface vessel, submarine or aircraft,
even before she has attacked or demanded surrender, if to do so will tend to prevent
her gaining a favourable position for attacking. 45

Subsequent instructions stated that the enemy had adopted such a policy of
sinking without warning.
At the outset of the Second World War, the German Navy incorporated
the Proces-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare, also known as
the Protocol of 1936, into the German Prize Code which was distributed to
submarine commanders.46 By October 17, 1939 Germany issued the order to
attack all enemy merchant ships without warning. 47 Thus, early in the conflict,
merchant ships and submarines of the opposing belligerents were attacking
one another without warning. Germany followed its operational area
declarations of the First World War by providing that vast areas of the North
Atlantic Ocean were a submarine operational zone in which Germany could
assume no responsibility for either damage to ships or injury to personne1. 48
On December 7, 1941, immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor,
the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations sent a secret message to the Commanderin-Chief, Pacific Fleet which stated:
EXECUTE AGAINST JAPAN UNRESTRICTED AIR AND SUBMARINE
WARFARE.49

Even though the "unrestricted" warfare was directed against Japan, it could
nevertheless present a possible danger to neutral shipping in the vast Pacific
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Ocean areas. Because the message was secret, it could not have provided
notification to neutral states. However, the almost complete absence of
neutral shipping in the Pacific made this problem more theoretical than real.
The only shipping which Japan treated as neutral consisted of Russian ships
sailing across the North Pacific between Siberian ports and Canadian and
United States ports in the Pacific Northwest. While the Soviet Union was
a belligerent in the European War, it remained technically neutral in the
Pacific War until a few days before the Japanese surrender.
Throughout the Pacific War,the merchant ships of both the United States
and Japan were fully integrated into the naval war effort. As a practical
matter, such ships were indistinguishable from formally commissioned naval
auxiliary warships,so and such merchant ships, like warships, were lawfully
subject to attack without warning. The United States reversed its prior
position and, along with Japan, and the other naval belligerents in the Pacific
War, it recognized that such merchant ships were functional warships and
were subject to the same rules of international law.
There are inconsistent analyses concerning the interpretation of the
Protocol of1936 as applied to the events of the Second World War. Professor
Robert Tucker, writing in a Naval War College "Blue Book," has stated
concerning the Atlantic War:
Despite this reaffirmation of the traditional law in the 1936 London Protocol, the record
ofbeIligerent measures with respect to enemy merchant vessels during World War II
fell far below the standards set in the preceding conflict. In the Atlantic Germany
resorted to unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare against British merchant vessels
almost from the very start of hostilities ....51
In the final stages of the conflict, the measures taken by Great Britain against enemy
shipping wherever encountered were only barely distinguishable from a policy of
unrestricted submarine warfare. 52

Professor Tucker has also commented on the legal situation in the Pacific
War:
In the Pacific War no attempt was made by either of the major naval belligerents to
observe the obligations laid down by the 1936 London Protocol. Immediately upon the
outbreak of war the United States initiated a policy of unrestricted aerial and submarine
warfare against Japanese merchant vessels, and consistently pursued this policy
throughout the course of hostilities. Japan, in turn, furnished no evidence of a willingness
to abide by the provisions of the Protocol. ...53

Another "Blue Book" contains a different analysis of this subject:
Professor Tucker has apparently assumed that the Protocol is designed to protect
merchant vessels which are participating in the naval war effort. This does not take
adequate account of the close relationship between the performance of combatant
functions and the ensuing liability to attack without warning. In addition, it is
inconsistent with the legislative history concerning the interpretation of "merchant
vessel" as used in the Protocol.54

The ambiguity concerning the terms "merchant ships" and "a merchant
vessel" used in article 22 of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 and in the
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identically worded Protocol of 1936 is considerably clarified by the Report
of the Committee of Jurists of April 3, 1930 written by the lawyers who
drafted the text.
The Committee wish to place it on record that the expression "merchant vessel," where
it is employed in the Declaration, is not to be understood as including a merchant vessel
which is at the moment participating in hostilities in such a manner as to cause her
to lose her right to the immunities of a merchant vessel. SS

This stated criterion is more realistic than a test which attempts to
distinguish between armed and unarmed merchant vessels. It is probably more
important for the efficient conduct of anti-submarine warfare in particular
contexts to have merchant ships make radio reports of submarine contacts
than to have such ships armed. In addition, the great unarmed British
passenger liners Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth each had the capability of
transporting an entire infantry division and its equipment at a high sustained
speed without naval escort and consequently provided a significant
contribution to the Allied naval war effort. Because of their effective
participation, it cannot be doubted that they were lawful objects of attack.
Although the 1936 Protocol is sometimes referred to as the "Submarine
Protocol," its second paragraph refers to "a warship, whether surface vessel
or submarine." Consequently, the identical legal regime concerning attacks
on merchant ships applies to both surface and submarine warships. Gunfire
from surface warships is the ultimate sanction of the long-distance blockade
employed by the Allied naval powers in both world wars. A surface warship
may lawfully attack a belligerent or neutral vessel which is attempting to
breach the blockade or resist visit and search.
One of the factors considered in treaty interpretation is the working
interpretation given to the treaty by the state-parties. 56 The original stateparties to the 1936 Protocol included the great naval powers of the time: Great
Britain, United States, Japan, France, and Italy.57 Germany became a stateparty shortly thereafter. 58 The working interpretation given to the Protocol
by all six of these state-parties which were naval belligerents in the Second
World War was that belligerent and neutral merchant ships participating in
the naval war effort were not entitled "to the immunities of a merchant
vessel" to use the wording employed by the Committee ofJurists who drafted
the text. Therefore, the Protocol of 1936 is accurately interpreted as applying
only to merchant ships which were not part of the war effort of the naval
belligerents. In the Second World War there were but few merchant ship~
entitled to this protection. This legal situation is not a drastic departure from
the traditional law which was applied prior to the World Wars. In that preexisting law the immunity of a merchant ship was also conditioned upon its
not participating in any way in the naval hostilities. The long-established
principle of customary law that a unit or ship may not exercise belligerent
functions without simultaneously becoming a lawful object of attack remains
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valid. There is no evidence to show that the Protocol of 1936 was designed
to change this.
A conclusion written several years ago appears to be equally applicable
now:
In summary. the juridical criteria to determine whether or not a merchant vessel is
participating in the war or hostilities in a way which results in losing "the immunities
of a merchant vessel" should be determined by the fact of such participation and not
by the particular method of participation.59

The most important category of ships immune from attack is hospital ships.
Customary law was first codified in the 1899 Hague Convention (III) for the
Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention
of 22 August 1864,60 which adapted the principles of the law of land warfare
for the protection of wounded in armies in the field, to the maritime
environment. Hague Convention (X) (1907)61 revised and enlarged the 1899
Hague Convention. It was applicable in both world wars. The first Geneva
Convention (1864)62 for the protection of war victims comprised only ten
articles and was limited to the protection of wounded personnel of armies
in the field and to attending hospital and ambulance personnel. 63 The 1907
Hague Convention prescribed the legal regime for hospital ships in more detail
than did the Hague Convention of 1899, specifying the external distinctive
markings of hospital ships and requiring such ships to provide medical
assistance to the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked personnel of the belligerents
without distinction of nationality. Military interests were protected by the
requirement that hospital ships must not be used for any military purpose.
As a general rule, the immunity of hospital ships was respected in both World
Wars with the exception of an incident in the First World War in which
a German submarine sank a British hospital ship.64
Cartel ships are also immunized from attack. The term "cartel"
traditionally referred to an agreement between enemy belligerents
concerning the exchange of prisoners of war. It is now used to refer to any
non-hostile interaction of the belligerents governed by special agreement. In
1945 the Japanese merchant ship Awa Maru undertook a voyage for a
prescribed purpose and upon a specified route agreed to by the United States
and Japan. 65 The principal purpose was to carry relief supplies furnished by
the United States to United States and Allied nationals held in Japanese
custody upon the Asian mainland. On the return voyage to Japan, the ship
was sunk without warning by a U.S. submarine. The commanding officer
of the submarine, who had not seen the message immunizing the vessel, was
subsequently relieved of his command and convicted by court martial of
negligence in carrying out orders.66 In the ensuing diplomatic interchange,
the United States apologized and offered to provide Japan with a vessel of
similar size and characteristics to replace the Awa Maru. 67
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The u.s. Supreme Court held in The Paquete Habana,6S a decision arising
from the Spanish-American War, that coastal fishing boats were not liable
to capture and condemnation in prize. The ruling in this case is codified in
Hague Convention No. XI (1907),69 which provides that vessels "used
exclusively for fishing along the coast or small boats employed in local trade
are exempt from capture." The Convention further provides that they cease
to be exempt whenever they take part in hostilities.

IV. The Application of the Law of Naval Targeting to War Crimes;
and Post Second World War Humanitarian Law Treaties
A. War Crimes Trials
1. The Trial of Admiral Doenitz
The only war crimes trials conducted by international tribunals were those
before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo. The International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg conducted the trial of the principal leaders
of the former German Government who were accused of war crimes or crimes
against humanity. The case in which the Tribunal directly addressed the law
of naval warfare was that of Admiral Doenitz, who initially commanded the
German submarine force and was subsequently commander-in-chief of the
navy. Admiral Doenitz was charged with planning aggressive war (count
one), conducting aggressive war (count two), and with war crimes (count
three) by "waging unrestricted submarine warfare contrary to the Naval
Protocol of1936. "70 Sir Hartley Shawcross, the chief British prosecutor, stated
to the Tribunal:
Nor need we take time to examine the astonishing proposition that the sinking of neutral
shipping was legalized by the process of making a paper order excluding such neutral
ships not from some definite war zone over which Germany exercised control but from
vast areas of the seas.71

The judgment of the Tribunal, after stating that it "is not prepared to hold
Doenitz guilty for his conduct of submarine warfare against British armed
merchant ships," continued:
However, the proclamation of operational zones and the sinking of neutral merchant
vessels which enter those zones presents a different question. This practice was employed
in the war of 1914-1918 by Germany and adopted in retaliation by Great Britain. The
Washington Conference of 1922, the London Naval Agreement of 1930, and the Protocol
of 1936 were entered into with full knowledge that such zones had been employed in
the First World War. Yet the Protocol made no exception for operational zones. The
order of Doenitz to sink neutral ships without warning when found within these zones
was, therefore, in the opinion of the Tribunal, a violation of the Protocol.72

The unreasonable and unworkable result of the holding here is that the
Tribunal accepts the legality of German operational or exclusion zones as
applied to belligerent merchant vessels but regards the same zones as unlawful
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when applied to neutral merchant vessels. In doing this, the Tribunal ignored
the fact that in the Second World War .many neutral merchant vessels were
sailing in the same convoys with belligerent merchant vessels and the two
were functionally indistinguishable from one another.
The term "neutral merchant vessels" used by the Tribunal is more precise
, than the wording concerning merchant vessels in the Protocol, but it remains
ambiguous and comprises at least two distinct categories: those engaged in
genuine inter-neutral trade which does not contribute to the economic
warfare resources of a belligerent, and those neutral vessels which through
acquiescence or ::oercion, participate in the naval war effort of a belligerent.
The factual re;llity was that there were no immune neutral vessels in the
.{\.tlantic O~.!an proscribed areas. The Tribunal's invocation of the
normatively'.imbiguous term, "neutral merchant vessels," enabled it to avoid
facing the facts concerning the integration of neutral shipping into the Allied
naval war effort. The Tribunal applied the Protocol to Admiral Doenitz as
if it were a criminal statute. He was found innocent on count one (planning
aggressive war), guilty on count two (conducting aggressive war), and guilty
on count three (war crimes). However, the ten year sentence imposed upon
Doenitz was claimed not to be based upon count three because the United
States also conducted "unrestricted submarine warfare" in the Pacific.13 The
result of this is that the sentence was based only on count two, according
to the Tribunal, which involved nothing more than Doenitz carrying out his
regularly assigned duties as a line officer.
The principal criticism concerning the Doenitz Case, however, is properly
directed at Sir Hartley Shawcross and the other British prosecution lawyers.
They either knew, or should have known, in the exercise of at least minimum
standards of professional responsibility, the factual reality of the integration
of almost all neutral shipping into the Allied naval war effort. 74 As it was,
they permitted the Tribunal to make a determination of guilt based on an
erroneous factual assumption even though the Tribunal stated that the
sentence was not based on this count.
2. Other War Crimes Trials
The war crimes trials other than the major trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo
took place before national military tribunals which applied the international
law of armed conflict. Captain Roskill, the official British historian of the
naval war 1939-1945, has written:
It is fair to mention there that, with one conspicuous exception, the captains of the
German disguised raiders conducted their opera,tions, which were a perfectly legitimate
form of warfare, with due regard to intemationallaw.75

The exception referred to by Captain Roskill was the commander of a surface
raider charged in the Trial of Von RuchteschelP6 before a British military tribunal
with failure to give quarter during an attack on a British merchant ship. The
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facts involved a daylight attack against the ship in which its wireless aerial
was destroyed with the raider's first'salvo. The raider maintained heavy fire
and signaled that the ship attacked was not to use its radio. The case report
states: "The captain of the Davisian stopped his engines, hoisted an answering
pennant and acknowledged the signal." The raider's gunfire continued,
however, for another fifteen minutes and wounded several crew members
while they were trying to abandon ship. Captain Von Ruchteschell was
convicted on the apparent basis that the ship attacked had given an
unequivocal indication of surrender. After this manifestation of surrender,
the Davisian was no longer a lawful object of attack.
In addition to the trial of Admiral Doenitz before the International Miliary
Tribunal at Nuremberg, there were two other cases involving the "Laconia
order" which was issued by Admiral Doenitz on September 17.1942 while
he was serving as commander of the German submarine force. Tills order
provided:
(1) No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of ships sunk, and this
includes picking up persons in the water and putting them in life boats, righting capsized
lifeboats and handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the rudimentary
demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews.
(2) Orders for bringing in captains and chief engineers still apply.
(3) Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements would be of importance for your
boat.
(4) Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy has no regard for women and children
in his bombing attacks on German cities.77

The Laconia order immediately followed Admiral Doenitz' attempt to
establish a rescue zone of immunity during the period September 12-16,1942,
Captain Roskill has described the facts:
In September 1942, a group of [four] U-boats and a "milch cow" (as the Germans called
their supply submarines) arrived south of the equator, and there on the 12th U.156 sank
the homeward-bound troop ship Laconia, which had 1,800 Italian prisoners on board.
On learning from survivors what he had done, Hartenstein, the U-boat's captain, sent
a series of messages en clair calling for help in the rescue work and promising immunity
to ships sent to the scene, provided that he himself was not attacked.78

Admiral Doenitz ordered other U-boats to the rescue and the Vichy French
Government was asked to send help from Dakar. The U-boats then took the
principal role in the rescue operations which included towing lifeboats toward
the African coast. This, of course, diverted the submarines from their regular
wartime missions. Captain Roskill's account continues:
All went well until the next afternoon [September 16] when an American Army aircraft
from the newly established base on Ascension Island arrived, flew around the surfaced
U-boats for about an hour, and then attacked U.156 with bombs. It is as impossible
to justify that act as it is difficult to explain why it was committed.79
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u.s. Air Force stated concerning this

A summary of operations from Ascension Island states that on the morning of 16
September 1942, a B-24 of the u.S. Army Air Forces sighted a submarine at 5 degrees
South, 11 degrees 40 minutes West. The sub, which was towing two lifeboats and was
in the process of picking up two more, was displaying a white flag with a red cross.
The sub did not show any national flag when challenged by the B-24. The plane left
the scene and contacted Ascension. Since no friendly subs were known to be in the area,
the plane was instructed to attack.SO

The person who issued the order to attack and the aircraft commander who
carried it out are both prima facie guilty of a war crime. The conduct of the
aircraft commander appears to be entirely inexcusable since he must have
observed the rescue operation. During the time that they are engaged in such
an operation, enemy submarines are no longer lawful objects of attack. The
fact that the u.s. Army Air Forces took no action to investigate this incident
and that no trials took place under the then-effective domestic military code,
the Articles of War, is a serious reflection on the entire chain of military
command. The attempt by Doenitz and Hartenstein to establish a rescue zone
of immunity would have been effective if it had not been for the bombing.
As it was, many of the personnel of the Laconia, including Italian prisoners
of war and British civilian passengers, were rescued in an attempt which
exemplifies the highest humanitarian traditions. The rescue attempt was
entirely consistent with the central objective of the law of armed conflict
to avoid unnecessary destruction of human values. Admiral Doenitz was
charged with violating the rescue provisions of the Protocol of 1936 by issuing
the order. There is, unfortunately, no evidence that the International Military
Tribunal gave appropriate consideration to the rescue zone of immunity as
the indispensable context in which the Laconia order was issued. The Tribunal
did not find him guilty on this charge but it stated that the ambiguous terms
of the order deserved the "strongest censure. "81
The second case, the Trial of MoehleB 2 before a British military tribunal,
involved a German U-boat flotilla commander who was charged with a war
crime in reading the Laconia order to captains of U-boats in his flotilla and
of resolving the ambiguity in the order by providing examples in which the
killing of survivors was approved. In convicting the defendant, the Tribunal
accepted the contention of the prosecution that the examples used amounted
to an order to kill.
Although the third case, the Trial of Eck ("The Peleus Trial")83 is widely
regarded as an implementation of the Laconia order, it is significant that the
defense in it did not invoke the order as a superior order which mandated
the killing of survivors. In this case, also before a British military tribunal,
the captain, two officers, and a rating of the German submarine U-8S2 were
charged with:
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Committing a war crime in that you in the Atlantic Ocean on the night of13-14th March
1944, when Captain and members of the crew ofUnterseeboot 852 which had sunk the
steamship PeTeus in violation of the laws and usages of war were concerned in the killing
of members of the crew of the said steamship, Allied nationals, by firing and throwing
grenades at them. 84

The prosecution resolved the ambiguity in the charge by stating that the
defendants were not accused of sinking a merchant ship without warning,
but of killing its survivors. The Peleus was of Greek registration and under
charter to the British Ministry of War Transport. Following the sinking, the
accused spent approximately five hours attacking the survivors and the
floating wreckage with machine gun fire and hand grenades. All of the
survivors except three were either killed or subsequently died of wounds.
The three were rescued about a month later and recounted the grim events.
The evidence indicated that the captain, Eck, ordered the shooting and that
the others carried out his orders. The principal defense claim was that the
actions were necessary to eliminate all traces of the sinking. An experienced
U-boat commander, who was called on behalf of the defense, testified that
the approved method of evading Allied anti-submarine attack following a
sinking was to leave the scene at high speed. All of the accused were found
guilty and Eck and the other two officers were condemned to death. 85
The Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East states:
Inhumane, illegal warfare at sea was waged by the Japanese Navy in 1943 and 1944.
Survivors of passengers and crews of torpedoed ships were murdered. 56

The commander of the Japanese First Submarine Force at Truk issued an order
on March 20, 1943 which is translated and quoted by the Far East Tribunal:
All submarines shall act together in order to concentrate their attacks against enemy
convoys and shall totally destroy them. Do not stop with the sinking of enemy ships
and cargoes; at the same time, you will carry out the complete destruction of the crews
of the enemy's ships; if possible, seize part of the crew and endeavor to secure information
about the enemy.51

Several examples of the carrying out of this flagrantly unlawful order are
referred to in the judgment of the Tribuna1. 88 One which is described in detail
involved the sinking of the United States flag Liberty-type merchant ship Jean
Nicolet, which had an armament manned by a U.S. Navy armed guard, and
the brutal murder of most of the survivors of the sinking. 89 The Tribunal
stated, inter alia, that the ship's boats were smashed by gunfire and that some
of the crew members, with their hands tied behind their backs, had to run
a gauntlet on the deck of the submarine before being forced into the water.
The remainder of the crew were left on the deck of the submarine when
it submerged. Twenty-two crew members who survived these grim events
were rescued the nex.t day and provided the testimony upon which the
Tribunal's findings of fact were based.
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Although aircraft attacked merchant vessels engaged in a belligerent's war
effort during the Second World War, no trials took place involving such
attacks. If such trials had taken place, they should have been conducted under
the same legal criteria which would be properly applied in the trials
concerning surface and submarine warfare.
B. Events Following the Battle of the Bismarck Sea
Unfortunately, it was not only Germans and Japanese who murdered
survivors of ships they had attacked and sunk. In March 1943 the Japanese
attempted to move about 7,000 soldiers by ship from Rabaul, New Britain
where their military situation was increasingly precarious, to reinforce the
Japanese Army in Lae, New Guinea. 90 This involved the transit of the
Bismarck Sea by a convoy of eight transports escorted by eight destroyers.
The U.S. Army Air Forces in the Pacific had had a poor record for
accurately targeting small islands, much less targeting moving ships, up to
this time. The new commander of the Fifth Air Force under General Douglas
MacArthur, the Commander-in-Chief Southwest Pacific, was Lieutenant
General George C. Kenney, who changed the situation by having his medium
bombers practice low-level attacks so that this capacity was added to the
existing capability of heavy bombers in high-level bombing. The result was
apparent in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea where the B-25 bombers sank
every transport in the convoy (except one sunk by high-level heavy bombers)
and half of the destroyers. Once the ships were sunk, the U.S. Armed Forces
followed practices, much criticized when the offenders were German or
Japanese, of killing as many of the helpless survivors in the water as possible.
Professor Samuel Eliot Morrison, the official historian of the U.S. Navy
during the Second World War, provides the following account:
Meanwhile planes and PTs went about the sickening business of killing survivors in
boats, rafts or wreckage. Fighters mercilessly strafed anything on the surface. On 5
March the two PTs which had sunk Oigawa Maru put out to rescue a downed pilot
and came on an enemy submarine receiving survivors from three large landing craft.
Torpedoes missed as the U-boat crash-dived. The PTs turned their guns on, and hurled
depth charges at the three boats-which, with over a hundred men on board, sunk.
It was a grisly task, but a military necessity since Japanese soldiers do not surrender
and, within swimming distance of shore, they could not be allowed to land and join
the Lae garrison.
Japanese submarines and destroyers saved 2,734 men from the convoy, but over 3,000
were missing. 91

It is difficult to accept Professor Morrison's facile statement that Japanese
soldiers do not surrender and his conclusion that a legitimate military necessity
was involved. Some members of the Japanese Armed Forces, including the
highly motivated Kamikaze pilots who participated in the Philippine and
Okinawa operations, did surrender. It is not credible that Japanese soldiers
without weapons who, it is assumed, could have made it to the New Guinea
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shore would have become a military asset to the Japanese Army there. The
greater probability concerning a then-unknown future is that they would have
become an additional burden upon the supply and medical resources of that
army.92 Another historian, Professor Ronald H. Spector, has provided a
substantially similar factual account of the events following the Battle of the
Bismarck Sea but has indicated some skepticism concerning the claim of
military necessity.93
If the same legal standards applied to Germans and Japanese who killed
helpless survivors are followed in evaluating the actions of the U.S. Army
Air Forces and the U.S. Navy following the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, there
is no way they can be described as other than flagrant violations of customary
and treaty law. It is a serious reflection on the entire chain of command that
there was no investigation and no charges were brought against those who
issued the orders. Justice Robert H. Jackson, the chief United States prosecutor
before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, stated the basic
legal principle in 1945:
If certain acts in violation of treaties are crimes, they are crimes whether the United
States does them or whether Germany does them, and we are not prepared to lay down
a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would not be willing to have invoked
against us.94

Hague Convention X for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the
Principles of the Geneva Convention (1907), a treaty of the United States,
provides in relevant part:
After each engagement, the two belligerents, so far as military interests permit, shall take
steps to look for the shipwrecked, sick and wounded, and to protect them, as well as the dead,
against pillage and ill-treatment.95

The limitation in the treaty concerning "military interests" refers to
legitimate military interests which are recognized as including only lawful
objects of attack and therefore prohibits attacks on helpless survivors.

C. Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked members of Armed Forces at Sea (1949)
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims 96 were
written in the shadow of the Second W orId War and were designed to prevent
repetition of some practices associated with that conflict. Geneva Convention
II sets forth more detail than Hague Convention X (1907) and in article 18
(1) provides:
After each engagement, Parties to the conflict shaIl without delay take all possible
measures to search for and coIlect the shipwrecked, wounded and sick, to protect them
against pillage and ill-treatment, to ensure their adequate care, and to search for the
dead and prevent their being despoiled.

The significance of this provision is that in addition to making "the
shipwrecked, wounded and sick" unlawful objects of attack, it imposes
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affirmative duties in terms of their protection and care on a nondiscriminatory basis. Articles 22-35 provide more effective immunization
from attack for hospital ships while prohibiting their use "for any military
purpose" or for any acts "harmful to the enemy." Such ships may not possess
or use secret communication codes and must be appropriately marked and
notified to the enemy belligerent so as to facilitate their identification as
hospital ships. Articles 36-40 provide enhanced protection for medical
personnel and for medical transports including aircraft.

D. Geneva Protocol I Concerning International Armed Conflicts (1977)
The Geneva Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law, which met for
a period of several weeks in each of the four years from 1974 to 1977, produced
Protocol I concerning international armed conflicts and Protocol II
concerning internal armed conflicts. These Protocols deal with both the
methods of armed conflict (known traditionally as "the Hague Law") and
the protection of war victims (known traditionally as "the Geneva Law").
The Protocols are designed to supplement the Geneva Conventions of 1949
by adding provisions which have become necessary as a result of more recent
developments in the methods of armed conflict.
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims ofInternational Armed Conflicts97 deals
with both the methods of armed conflict and the protection of war victims
in land combat situations, including those involving aircraft, as well as lawful
objects of attack. Protocol I is a treaty in force with 86 state-parties currently,
including several middle level military powers and allies of the United States. 98
This constitutes more than half of the states in the world community and
accords the Protocol a significant status as law through the agreement of
states. In addition, many of the provisions of the Protocol are codifications
of customary law. 99 The two major military powers which are state parties
are the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union. The. position of the
Reagan Administration was that Protocol I, which the United States has
signed, will not be submitted to the ratification process. too
Articles 48-67 of the Protocol comprise a section which provides certain
protections for the civilian population from the effects of hostilities including
attack by aerial bombardment. Article 49(3) refers specifically to "sea
warfare" and provides:
The provisions of this Section apply to any land, air or sea warfare which may affect
the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects on land. They further apply
to all attacks from the sea or from the air against objectives on land but do not otherwise
affect the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict at sea or in the air.

Other provisions specify methods and objects of attack which are unlawful.
Article 51(4) prohibits indiscriminate attacks and describes them as attacks
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"of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects
without distinction." Article 51(5) provides in full:
Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate:
(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single
military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located
in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or
civilian objects; and
(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.1°
'

Sub-section (b) above is a codification of long-standing customary law.
Article 51(6) provides in comprehensive terms that attacks "against the
civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals are prohibited,"
supplementing the prohibition on reprisals against protected civilian persons
in Geneva Convention IV for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War. 102 Article 54(1) of the Protocol states: "Starvation of civilians as a
method of warfare is prohibited." This appears to prohibit the comprehensive
economic blockades imposed by the major Allied naval powers in both World
Wars because one of the principal effects of such blockades was the starvation
of civilians. A question of fact arises as to what extent particular segments
of the civilian population are incorporated into the war effort.
Articles 21-31 concern medical transportation. Article 22 provides a more
comprehensive protection for hospital ships and coastal rescue craft than that
provided in Geneva Convention II. For example, this article extends the
protections of Convention II beyond hospital ships provided by a party to
the conflict to also include hospital ships provided by a neutral or other state
which is not a party to the conflict or by an impartial international
humanitarian organization. The most obvious example of the latter category
is the International Committee of the Red Cross. Article 23 provides
protection to medical ships and craft whether they are located "at sea or in
other waters," thereby covering territorial waters and internal waters such
as ports, lakes and rivers.

V. The Application of the Law of Targeting to
Selected Situations Since 1945
A. The Korean Armed Conflict
The naval aspects of the Korean conflict were characterized by the
overwhelming superiority of the United Nations naval forces.1 03 The
operational command at sea was exercised by the Commander of the U.S.
Seventh Fleet and comprised ships and aircraft of the United States Navy,
British Commonwealth navies, and several allied navies. The exercise of
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complete control of the seas made it possible to conduct a close-in naval
blockade of the Korean coasts which was similar to the blockades in use in
the nineteenth century. The North Korean government had no significant
naval forces and there was no evidence of successful attempts to breach the
blockade. Operational plans provided for the use of visit and search of any
enemy or neutral vessels which were encountered. The intercepted vessels
consisted largely of North Korea deep-sea fishing vessels equipped with radio
transmitters and receivers. There was evidence that a number of these vessels
were employed to obtain intelligence concerning the location and disposition
of warships under the United Nations Command. These vessels were captured
and where appropriate, their crews were made prisoners of war. None of
them was entitled to status as immunized objects under the holding in The
Paquete Rabana104 concerning the immunity of small coastal fishing boats which
were not involved in the enemy armed conflict effort.
Fish was a main staple of the Korean diet, particularly for coastal villages,
in both the north and the south. It was decided, nevertheless, that fish would
be declared contraband and that the elimination of even coastal fishing would
add to the enemy logistic problems and provide an inducement to turn civilians
against the North Korean regime. Leaflets in the Korean language with the
following text were made available to as many North Korean fishermen as
could be reached in September 1950:
The Communists brought this terrible war down upon you. You cannot fish from your
boats until the Communists are killed or thrown out. The United Nations Forces are
human and do not desire to harm innocent victims of the war, but if you try to fish
again before the Communists are completely defeated, you must suffer the consequences.
A legal blockade has been declared and is enforced by United Nations Forces.t 05

When fishing was attempted thereafter, coastal boats were confiscated, and
in some instances destroyed, and the fishermen were returned to the beach.
No evidence was produced which indicated that North Korean military forces
suffered significant logistical harm as the result of the ban on fishing. In
contrast, there is evidence that North Korean fishing villages were reduced
to starvation. Apparently, some of the fishermen were so desperate that they
were reduced to attempting to spear fish in shallow water .106 There is no doubt
that this ban constituted a violation of the customary law immunizing coastal
fishing boats enunciated in The Paquete Rabana and codified in Hague
Convention XI Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise
of the Right of Capture in Naval War (1907).1 07
Shore bombardment and aerial bombing in support of United States and
allied land forces were conducted in the same way that the U.S. Pacific Fleet
operated during the Second World War .108 In any area where civilian persons
and objects were present, every effort was made to confine the bombardment
to military targets. An example concerning the bombardment at Inchon prior
to and during the famous amphibious landing behind enemy lines which
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changed the course of the conflict was provided by the orders of Commander,
Seventh Fleet:
Vice Admiral Struble's orders to the bombardment forces clearly specified that there
should be no promiscuous firing at the city itself or at civilian installations. To achieve
this, the entire objective area had been divided [in target area maps] into 60 sub-areas.
Known military targets had been previously assigned, and those which offered the
greatest potential hazard to our landing forces were circled in red. It had been agreed
that any ship could fire into a red circle area with or without a "spot" [by observer
aircraft]. In the uncircled areas, however, firing was permitted only if definite targets
were found and an air spot was available. This differentiation between types of areas
was adopted to reduce destruction of non-military targets to a minimum, to save the
city ofInchon for occupation forces, and to avoid injury to civilian personne1. 109

There is substantial evidence that this same systematic distinction between
civilians and civilian objects and military personnel and objects was made
when the bombardment objectives were located in North Korea in proximity
to civilians there. The result was that shore bombardment was conducted in
substantial compliance with Hague Convention IX Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces (1907).110

B. The Cuban Missile Crisis: Self-Defense and Targeting
The issue of the lawfulness of naval targeting is usually considered apart
from the issue of self-defense or aggression in situations of ongoing armed
conflict. Where there is no ongoing armed conflict, it is necessary to comply
with the international law of self-defense in order to provide authority for
the use of naval targeting. There are three indispensable requirements to
justify in law military measures involving naval targeting which are based
upon a claim of self-defense. 111 They are: (1) A good faith attempt to use
peaceful procedures; (2) actual necessity (as opposed to a sham or pretense)
in the context of either an existing armed aggression or a threat of armed
aggression against the defending state which is both credible and imminent;
and (3) proportionality in responding defensive measures. The elements of
these requirements, which were developed over a long period of time in
customary international law, are now codified in the United Nations Charter,
a treaty of the United States.
Article 2(3) of the Charter provides:
All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner
that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

Article 2(4) provides:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The complementary article 51 provides in relevant part:

s.v. Mallison and W.T. Mallison

263

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs....

The "inherent right," which is the customary law, requires both actual
necessity for and proportionality in responding defensive measures. The
English language text of article 51 is neither well-drafted nor consistent with
the negotiating history at the San Francisco Conference which reveals that
reasonable and necessary anticipatory self-defense was retained and that selfdefense is not limited only to the situation of an "armed attack." The wording
cannot be read as if it stated: "if, and only if, an armed attack occurs." The
more carefully drafted and equally authentic French text of article 51 uses
the term "aggression armee" which includes, but is not limited to, armed
attack, and this is consistent with the negotiating history. The view of
Committee I at San Francisco that article 2(4) does not impair the customary
law of self-defense is set forth in the words of its rapporteur, "The use of
arms in legitimate self-defense remains admitted and unimpaired. "112 The
words "inherent right" in the English text refer to the preexisting customary
law and, therefore, include anticipatory self-defense. Because the doctrines
concerning anticipatory self-defense may be even more subject to abuse than
the doctrines concerning an existing armed aggression, the three criteria are
applied with greater stringency where anticipatory self-defense is claimed.ll3
A preeminent example of the application of these principles is the famous
Caroline incident of1837 which involved a river steamer of that name employed
by u.S. nationals to aid the rebels in the then civil war in Canada. 114 The
British Government (then the sovereign in Canada) had attempted
unsuccessfully to have the u.S. Government prevent assistance to the rebels.
Thereafter, Canadian troops came into United States territory and destroyed
the Caroline to prevent its imminent further use. The British Government
claimed reasonable and necessary anticipatory self-defense. The diplomatic
exchange is best known for Secretary of State Webster's formulation of the
requirements of self-defense as involving a "necessity of that self-defense
[which] is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation. "115 This statement is too restrictive since a credible
threat may be imminent without being "instant" and more than a "moment
for deliberation" is required to make a lawful choice of means. The most
important of Mr. Webster's words carefully specified the requirements of
proportionality as follows:
[N]othing unreasonable or excessive [is permitted], since the act justified by the necessity
of self-defense, must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it. 116

The legal significance of the Caroline incident is that it illustrates compliance
with the three requirements of international law. The British attempted to
use peaceful procedures, were confronted with an imminent danger of attack,
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and employed coercion in response which was strictly proportional, and the
incident was resolved on this basis.
On October 16, 1962 President Kennedy received the "first preliminary
hard information" showing the establishment of missile bases with an
offensive targeting capability in Cuba.ll7 Aerial surveillance of Cuba was
increased and conclusive photographic evidence of the inter-continental
capability of the emplacements was obtained in the next few days. On October
18, 1962, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visited the President and assured
him that Soviet assistance to Cuba "pursued solely the purpose of contributing
to the defense capabilities of Cuba."
President Kennedy and his advisers met in a group that subsequently became
known as the "Executive Committee." A wide range of responses, from socalled "pin-point bombing" and invasion to doing nothing, was considered.
Because there was no Soviet armed attack, lesser military responses were
considered with full realization that if they were ineffective, more coercive
uses of military power including naval targeting would be employed.
In the decade of the 1950s, much emphasis was placed upon plans involving
"massive retaliation" with nuclear weapons or, as it was put informally, "a
bigger bang for a buck." In contrast, some naval officers and civilians at the
Naval War College in Newport and in the Navy Department in Washington
continued to manifest an interest in limited uses of naval power. Among them
was Rear Admiral Robert D. Powers, USN, who in 1958 wrote an influential
article in the Naval Institute Proceedings entitled "Blockade: For Winning
Without Killing. "118 The article emphasized the potential uses in the nuclear
age of a limited naval blockade with characteristics quite different from the
comprehensive economic blockades conducted successfully by the Allied
powers in two World Wars. In October 1962, when Admiral Powers was
serving as the Deputy Judge Advocate General of the Navy, he wrote the
initial draft of a proposal for a limited naval blockade of Cuba to interdict
further missiles and components and to remove the existing ones. Following
consultations with Rear Admiral Mott, the Navy JAG, Admiral Anderson,
the Chief of Naval Operations, and General Maxwell Taylor, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, some changes were made in the draft and General
Taylor took it to the "Executive Committee" where it was considered along
with other recommendations in formulating the President's proclamation of
October 23 entitled "Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to
Cuba. "119 In the text, as in the title, the term "blockade" was avoided so
that there could be no confusion between the limited measures taken and the
comprehensive economic blockades of the World Wars. The effectuation of
the quarantine-interdiction, nevertheless, involved a limited naval blockade
with offensive missiles having nuclear capability and inter-continental range
classified as "prohibited material" which was functionally equivalent to
contraband.
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The President announced the measures to be taken in a radio and television
address on October 22 which, in substance, made a claim of necessary and
reasonable anticipatory national self-defense. On October 23 the prevailing
opinion in the United Nations Security Council, which was initially skeptical
about the factual claims made by the United States, changed drastically with
the circulation by Ambassador Stevenson of copies of the aerial photographs
showing the clandestinely established missile launching sites in Cuba. Also
on October 23 the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American
States made the claim of anticipatory collective self-defense. Beginning on
October 24, the ships carrying further offensive weapons to Cuba turned back
rather than encounter the blockading naval forces. What had appeared at
times to be a potential nuclear confrontation between the United States and
the Soviet Union was resolved by the Kennedy-Kruschev Agreement which
resulted in the removal of the existing missile emplacements. l20
The United States' responding measures in the Cuban Missile Crisis met
each of the legal requirements for anticipatory self-defense. In view of the
misleading statements made to the President by Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko. it was deemed that the requirement of attempted peaceful
procedures had been met and that it was futile to attempt further
communications on the subject at that time. The drastic change in the nuclear
balance of forces which would have resulted from the emplacement of Soviet
missiles with nuclear capability in Cuba constituted the most serious kind of
imminent danger to the United States and the Western Hemisphere. The
character of the danger required that action be taken before the missiles were
armed and operational. If delay had taken place until the missiles could be
fired or used as the basis for "nuclear blackmail," it would have been too
late. For these reasons, the requirement of an actual and imminent danger
was met. The limited naval blockade amounted to the least possible use of
military force in response and easily met the requirement of proportionality.
The operational planning for the limited naval blockade of Cuba included
consideration of the lawful objects of naval targeting and the methods which
should be employed against them. If the ships carrying further offensive
weapons had not turned back on October 24, the contingency plans would
have been acted on and the traditional procedures applicable to ships
attempting to breach a blockade would have been used. The penultimate
paragraph of the Presidential Proclamation provided:
Any vessel or craft which may be proceeding toward Cuba may be intercepted and
may be directed to identify itself. its cargo, equipment and stores, and its ports of call,
to stop, to lie to, to submit to visit and search, or to proceed as directed. Any vessel
or craft which fails or refuses to respond to or comply with directions shall be subject
to being taken into custody.121

The ultimate sanction was reserved for ships which refused to submit to
visit and search or attempted to run the blockade. Such ships would have
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become lawful objects of attack and after failure to respond to warning could
be sunk by naval gunfire. The final paragraph of the Presidential Proclamation
stated:
In carrying out this order, force shall not be used except in case of failure or refusal
to comply with directions, or with regulations or directives of the Secretary of Defense
issued hereunder, after reasonable efforts have been made to communicate them to the
vessel or craft, or in case of self-defense. In any case, force shall be used only to the
extent necessary.l22

The Cuban Missile Crisis, in addition to providing a modern model of the
criteria for lawful anticipatory national and collective self-defense, illustrates
the flexibility of naval force in achieving national objectives without the
destruction of human or material values through its presence at the blockade
line and without employing the full range of coercive measures which it
possesses. The compliance with the international law criteria of self-defense
provided legal authority for the use of the blockade and the necessary measures
of naval coercion to enforce it.

c.

The Attack on the U.S.S. Liberty
The 1967 attack on the Liberty has been summarized as follows:
At 1403 on Thursday, 8 June 1967 the U.S. electronics intelligence ship Liberty (AGTR
5) was steaming at a leisurely five knots, 14 miles offshore from the Egyptian town
ofEI Arish on the Mediterranean coast of Sinai, when she was attacked by Israeli fighterbombers. The attack continued for seven minutes, leaving eight of the ship's crew dead
or dying, more than 100 wounded, and the ship riddled and burning.
Fourteen minutes later, the Liberty was attacked by three Israeli torpedo boats which
raked the ship with gunfire-killing another four men-and then launched torpedoes.
One torpedo hit a communications compartment, multiplying the Liberty's dead to a
total of 34. Within 30 minutes of the torpedo attack, two helicopters carrying armed
troops appeared alongside, and two jet fighters loitered in the sky astern as if poised
for strikes. As suddenly as it had started, everything stopped. Israel said it was a
"mistake. "123

It should be added that the attacks took place on a sunny day in international
waters following a long period of Israeli aerial surveillance of the vessel. 124
The Liberty's flag at the mainmast was clearly visible and its white hull
identification markings as well as its physical appearance made it very
different from any Egyptian warship or Egyptian flag merchant ship.
Following the torpedo attack, life rafts were dropped over the side of the
ship, secured by a heavy line so that they would be available readily in case
the order to abandon ship had to be given. The torpedo boats attacked the
life rafts with gunfire, sinking two and cutting the line on the third. The
Israeli torpedo boats then sped away taking the third life raft with them.
There are two inescapable conclusions which follow from the facts involved
in the attack. First, the facts show that the attack was deliberate. The
Government ofIsrael offered a number of unpersuasive excuses for the attack
including that the ship was mistaken for the Egyptian naval coastal transport
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El Quseir which was a ship half the size of the Liberty and of distinctly different
appearance. The six hours of close-in aerial surveillance of the ship prior to
the initial aerial attack combined with the ideal visual conditions rule out
the possibility of a mistake.1 25
The second necessary conclusion is that the law applicable to objects of
attack was violated. The Liberty was a neutral ship sailing in international
waters and it was apparent that it was not participating directly or indirectly
in any belligerent state's naval war effort. As such, it was a ship lawfully
immune from attack. In addition, the life rafts would have been illegal objects
of attack in any circumstances. The attack on the life rafts, which was the
last attack when the Liberty was afire and listing heavily, was a violation of
the Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 1949. 126 Whatever
the Israeli motivation for the attack may have been, the conclusion of its
illegality remains. 127

D. The Vietnam Armed Conflict
One of the problems confronted by the government of the Republic of
Vietnam (South Vietnam) in the course of the ongoing hostilities in 1965 was
the infiltration by small craft of enemy weapons and supplies through its
territorial and contiguous waters. Operation Market Time, a cooperative
endeavor of the u.S. Navy and the South Vietnam Navy, was designed to
provide surveillance and inspection to prevent such infiltration in the threemile territorial sea and in a nine-mile contiguous zone. 128 The time-honored
procedures of visit and search were employed. Gunfire from naval vessels
was the ultimate sanction, but it was not employed unless visit and search
was resisted. 129 Because the operation was conducted within territorial waters
where sovereign authority existed and within a reasonable contiguous zone,
there was no conflict with international law. The measures employed were
an aspect of the overall South Vietnamese claim to self-defense and the only
objects of attack were lawful since they were limited to craft participating
in the enemy war effort and resisting visit and search.
By 1972 most of the United States Army and Marine Corps forces had been
withdrawn from Vietnam. In late March and early April of that year, the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) launched a major attack
across the "Demilitarized Zone" into South Vietnam. The U.S. Government
responded with air attacks and a mining campaign directed against the port
of Haiphong and other North Vietnamese ports.130 The great majority of
weapons and other military supplies imported by North Vietnam arrived by
sea, and about 40 cargo ships called at these ports each month. President Nixon
announced the mining May 8, 1972. Thereafter, it was announced that the
ports, including internal and territorial waters, would be mined commencing
at 0900 Saigon time on May 9 and that the mines were set to activate
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automatically at 1800 hours Saigon time on May 11. This was done to permit
vessels then in North Vietnamese ports ample time to depart before the mines
were activated. The mines were laid by aircraft from u.S. Navy carriers and
the interdiction resulted in no foreign merchant ships being sunk. Even though
the United States did not use the blockade terminology, the mining campaign
complied with the historic criteria for a close-in blockade. The announcement
of the mining was widely publicized so that neutrals were informed in
advance. It was limited to North Vietnam and did not block access to neutral
ports. The blockade appears to have been effective and easily met the criteria
of the Declaration of Paris that a blockade "must be effective, that is to say
maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the
enemy. "131 In addition, the mines were passive weapons and no ship was made
an object of attack unless it activated the mines by entering or leaving one
of the North Vietnamese ports. In comparison with the aerial bombing
campaign where military objects were attacked with the possibility of
ancillary civilian destruction,132 the mining was a very restrained response
to the North Vietnamese attack.133 For all of these reasons, the mining
complied with both the historic and contemporary criteria of international
law concerning objects of attack.
The available evidence indicates that the U.S. Navy conducted shore
bombardment of military objectives under the same limitations which were
observed during the Korean conflict. 134 The bombardment was sometimes
conducted in support of United States and South Vietnamese ground force
operations. The objects of attack were lawful for the same reasons that the
objects of attack were lawful in the shore bombardments during the Korean
conflict. 135

E. The Falklands/Malvinas Armed Conflict
Following the Argentinian invasion and conquest of the Falklands/Malvinas
Islands in early April 1982 (which was accomplished withQut bloodshed due
to the Argentine avoidance of civilian casualties), Great Britain sent a naval
task force to regain the islands. 136 The task force was comprised of two small
aircraft carriers with V/STOL (vertical short take off and landing) aircraft,
five nuclear-powered attack submarines, eight guided missile destroyers,
fifteen general purpose frigates, and a number of smaller combatant vessels
including minesweepers and landing craft. The task force also contained
several Royal Fleet Auxiliaries and a number of requisitioned commercial
vessels including the liners Canberra and Queen Elizabeth II, used as troop
transports, and the liner Uganda, used as a hospital ship. The entire task force,
except for the Uganda which was not made an object of attack by Argentina,137
consisted of vessels which were lawful objects of attack. Argentine Air Force
and Navy aircraft inflicted substantial damage on ships of the task force and
sank the destroyers Sheffield and Coventry, the frigates Antelope and Ardent, and
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the landing craft Sir Galahad. l38 An aircraft-launched missile, apparently
intended for one of the British aircraft carriers, sank the merchant ship Atlantic
Conveyor which had participated in the naval war effort by carrying a cargo
of helicopters and other military equipment.
On May 1 the nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror shadowed an Argentine
Navy task force consisting of the large light cruiser General Belgrano139 and
two destroyers equipped with Exocet anti-ship missiles. The task force was
operating south of a British exclusion zone of April 12 which covered a circle
from the center of the islands with a 200 mile radius. On May 2 the Conqueror
received permission from the British Cabinet to attack and it sank the Belgrano
with two torpedoes, causing the death of more than 300 members of the
crew.140 There can be no doubt but that- this was the sinking of a lawful object
of attack. The British maritime exclusion zone was, however, interpreted
by some as not extending to objects of attack outside of the zone.t 41 The
apparent outcome was a British naval victory followed by a substantial
political defeat in world public opinion. After the sinking of the Belgrano,
Argentine surface combatants remained within the Argentine territorial and
internal waters.
On June 6 the u.s. Maritime Administration informed both Great Britain
and Argentina of a list of United States flag vessels and United States interest
vessels (owned by U.S. nationals but flying a foreign flag of convenience)
traversing the South Atlantic to ensure that these neutral vessels would not
be attacked. The U.S. interest Liberian flag tanker Hercules was sailing from
the East Coast of the United States to Alaska via Cape Horn.142 On June 8,
when it was approximately 600 nautical miles off the Argentine coast and
500 miles from the Falkland Islands, it was attacked by Argentine aircraft
in three different strikes using bombs and air-to-surface rockets. It proceeded
to Rio de Janeiro harbor and, following a survey by Brazilian Navy authorities
who determined that the damage was extensive and that unexploded bombs
could not be removed safely, it was taken out to deep water and sunk. As
a neutral vessel not participating in the British naval effort, the Hercules was
clearly not a lawful object of attack. Following the refusal of the Government
of Argentina to pay compensation, the owner brought an unsuccessful suit
against that country under the Federal Alien Tort Act in the United States.143

F. The Iran-Iraq Armed Conflict
The Iranian war effort was supported financially almost entirely by the
export of its oil.l44 The "Tanker War" of 1980-1988 was carried on by Iraq
exclusively through air attacks, and the targets of the substantial majority
of Iraqi attacks were tankers transporting Iranian oil. Both Iran and Iraq
proclaimed exclusion zones in which shipping was subject to attack.
Approximately one half of the Iraqi attacks were within the Iraqi prescribed
exclusion zones, and the other half were within the Iranian exclusion zone.145
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The available information indicates that most of the Iraqi attacks were not
preceded by visual identification of the target. Apparently Iraqi Air Force
planes targeted radar location of ships on the ~ssumption that such
identification of targets within one of the exclusion zones must be a tanker
carrying Iranian oil or a tanker in ballast which was scheduled to take on
Iranian oil. Because of the location of the targets in the exclusion zones and
the usual absence of immune vessels from such zones, the Iraqi attacks cannot
be appraised as indiscriminate even though carried out without visual
identification.
The lack of visual identification was a cause of the Iraqi accidental attack
on the guided-missile frigate U.S.S. Stark (FFG-31) on May 17, 1987, in
international waters outside of any of the exclusion zones. 146 The air-tosurface missiles struck the ship, killing 37 crew members and wounding a
substantial number of others. Published reports indicate that the Stark
personnel and equipment were not ready to defend the ship even though the
attacking aircraft was identified before the missiles were fired. Efficient
damage control procedures prevented the Stark from sinking. It is apparent
that the Stark, as a neutral warship in international waters, was not a lawful
object of attack and the Iraqi Government apologized, assumed full
responsibility, and agreed to pay damages.
The analysis of the lawfulness of the Iraqi air attacks is clearly applicable
to the targeting of Iranian flag tankers. In addition, a general rule is that
neutral ships acquire the character of an enemy merchant vessel when they
are participating directly or indirectly in the enemy war effort.1 47
Consequently, neutral flag tankers involved in the export ofIranian oil were
equally lawful objects of attack by the Iraqi Air Force. Iran could not lawfully
immunize its export of oil from attack by simply placing it on neutral ships.
Early in the war, Iranian air attacks knocked out Iraqi oil terminals in the
Gulf and effectively prevented access to Iraqi ports. Thereafter, Iraq exported
its oil overland by pipeline and received some of its war sustaining material
through Kuwaiti and Saudi ports. 148 The six neutral states which comprised
the Gulf Cooperation Council were increasingly concerned about the Iranian
attacks on neutral shipping. In partial response to this concern, the United
Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 552 on June 1, 1984. It reaffirmed
"the right of free passage in international waters and sea lanes for shipping
en route to and from all ports and installations of the littoral States that are
not parties to the hostilities," condemned the Iranian attacks on "commercial
ships en route to and from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia," demanded
that such attacks" cease forthwith," and that there "be no interference with
ships en route to and from States that are not parties to the hostilities. " This
amounts to a clear statement of the right of neutral shipping to be free from
attack in international waters. The Security Council took this position even
though the facts showed that both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were providing
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significant assistance to the Iraqi war effort by the overland transport of
supplies and in other ways. The Council apparently was convinced that, on
balance, the Gulf Cooperation Council states and their shipping retained
neutral status. This decision seems to have been influenced by the fact that
the neutral ships of the Gulf Cooperation Council states, including the
Kuwaiti reflagged tankers, were not engaged in assisting the Iraqi war effort
by carrying Iraqi oil. It should be added that Resolution 552 does not condemn
the Iraqi attacks.
Iran's air and surface attacks on shipping typically followed visual
identification. The selected targets were indiscriminate in that they included
unlawful attacks on ships engaged in genuine inter-neutral trade. Some of
the targets selected were ships carrying Iraqi war-sustaining material to
Kuwaiti or Saudi ports for overland transport to Iraq. While the attacks
caused damage to ships and personnel, they did not usually bring about sinkings
because of the lack of efficient anti-ship missiles. 149 Although Iran had
sufficient surface combatant ships to conduct visit and search, there is no
evidence that it did so on a regular basis. Consequently, the contraband or
immune character of particular cargoes was usually unknown to Iranian
attackers. Iran claimed that its actions were in reprisal to the Iraqi attacks,
but since these Iraqi attacks were lawful, there is no basis for the claim. The
indiscriminate Iranian attacks must be appraised as unlawful.
Iran also laid moored mines, many of which broke their cables, in the
international waters of the Gulf. Unlike the mining of North Vietnamese
ports, where the location of the mines in territorial and internal waters and
the notice to neutral shipping resulted in no damage to neutral ships, the
Iranian mining was not announced and was apparently directed at neutral
shipping. ISO This unlawful activity was substantially curtailed following the
United States helicopter attack and capture of the Iranian minelayer Iran Ajr
on September 21, 1987. 151 The minelaying was taking place about 50 miles
northeast of Bahrain in an area used by ships before moving to oil-loading
terminals.
The U.S. Middle East Force which had previously consisted of only three
to five ships was substantially augmented during 1987. 152 In early 1987 the
Government of Kuwait was increasingly concerned about Iranian attacks on
tankers transporting Kuwaiti oil and it approached both the Soviet Union
and the United States for assistance. Kuwait chartered three Soviet-flag longhull tankers. 153 In May of the same year the Kuwaiti and United States
Governments agreed that the United States would reflag eleven Kuwaiti
tankers consistent with recognized international legal procedures. l54 The plans
and procedures for U.S. Navy escort of these neutral tankers were agreed
upon by the Middle East Force and the Kuwaiti Oil Tanker Company. In
the initial convoy of reflagged tankers in July 1987, the lead tanker, the 401 ,382
ton Bridgeton struck a mine. 155 It successfully completed the voyage at reduced
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speed, although it was subsequently out of use for several months while the
damage was repaired. Since the hull of the Bridgeton was substantially thicker
than the hulls of the escorting warships, its master recommended that the
escorts fall in astern of his ship, which they did. l56 The Bridgeton as a neutral
tanker not participating in the war effort of either belligerent, was an
unlawful object of attack.
A number of small Iranian combatant vessels became lawful objects of
attack by approaching the neutral vessels convoyed by the u.S. Navy in a
hostile manner and were driven off or sunk by u.S. Navy vessels or
helicopters. Meanwhile, because of the danger to other neutral shipping,
including attacks by small Iranian combatant vessels using machine guns and
rocket-propelled grenades, the British, French, Italian, Dutch and Belgian
navies sent a number of small combatant vessels, including minesweepers, to
the Gulf and escorted neutral vessels under their flags. l57
On October 16, 1987, the U.S.-reflagged former Kuwaiti tanker Sea Isle
City located about ten miles off Mina aI-Ahmadi was hit and damaged by
a Silkworm missile fired by Iran from Fao Peninsula with the result of damage
to the ship and injuries to personne1. 158 Three days later the U.S.Navy shelled
and blew up an Iranian oil platform east of Bahrain and destroyed the
electronic equipment on a nearby platform. Prior to the shelling, the United
States gave notice of the impending action so that personnel would have the
opportunity to evacuate the platforms, and it was believed that they did so.
This attack' on what was considered a lawful target was a limited and
proportionate response to the attack on the Sea Island City. It should be added
that there were no further attacks using Silkworm missiles on U.S. flagged
vessels.

G. The April 1986 Attack on Libya: Self-Defense and Targeting
Authors' note:
This section was written based on the best information the authors were able to obtain
from the available unclassified sources. They have been reliably informed that there
is also classified material which contributed to the decisions made and actions taken
in the planning and carrying out of this attack. Neither of the authors has access to
such information and such access would not be consistent with their independent
professional work. The present analysis emphasizes the law applicable to targeting.

The Reagan Administration claimed that the attacks on Benghazi and
Tripoli on April 15, 1986 (April 14, Washington, D.C. time), were justified
on the basis of self-defense. It is therefore necessary to apply the international
law of self-defense (as in the analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis) and other
possible legal grounds for the attack to the events. The law of targeting will
then be applied to determine the compliance with its requirements by the
U.S. Navy and Air Force in the attack. The factual background which will
be examined initially is essential to an understanding of the law.
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1. The Factual Background
Attacks took place at the El Al Israel airline counters in the Rome and
Vienna airports on December 27, 1985, resulting in 19 civilian casualties
including five United States nationals, and among them, Natasha Simpson,
an 11 year old girl.159 President Reagan commented on those grim events in
the opening statement at his press conference on January 7, 1986:
It's clear that the responsibility for these latest attacks lies squarely with the terrorist
known as .Abu Nidal and his organization.... But these murderers could not carry
out their crimes without the sanctuary and support provided by regimes such as Col.
Qadhafi's in Libya. Qadhafi's longstanding involvement in terrorism is welldocumented, and there's irrefutable evidence of his role in these attacks .... By
providing material support to terrorist groups which attack u.s. citizens, Libya has
engaged in armed aggression against the United States under established principles of
international law, just as ifhe [sic] had used its own armed forces.I 60

In response to a question at the press conference, the President stated, inter
alia, "I can assure you that we have the evidence.... Abu Nidal has more
or less moved his headquarters there into Libya. "161 The President issued an
Executive Order on the same day, which stated:
I, RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States of America, find that the policies
and actions of the Government of Libya constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat
to the national security and foreign policy of the United States and hereby declare a
national emergency to deal with that threat... .162

Secretary of State Schultz' address to the National Defense University on
January 15, 1986, considered recent episodes of terrorism under the title,
"Low-Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity. "163 He recommended
military responses to such "warfare" conducted against the United States
while pointing out, "The law requires that such actions be necessary and
proportionate. "164 Apparently the Libyan connection with the airport murders
was that some of the perpetrators carried passports which had belonged to
Tunisians who had worked in Libya. 165 This information is equivocal and
consequently mayor may not indicate Libyan support for these terrorist
actions. Professor Richard E. Rubenstein, in his study of contemporary
terrorism, states:
In fact, no evidence demonstrating Libyan complicity in these attacks was ever produced.
Calling this episode of terrorism "war" was primarily a frustrated response, signifying
acceptance of the principle of collective responsibility: if we cannot find and punish
the perpetrators, we will punish their suppliers and sympathizers.... Militarily, it
reflects the questionable premise that drying up the terrorists' external sources of supply
will terminate their activities. Morally, it is intended to justify retaliation in which
innocent civilians get hurt. And politically. it ends the search for indigenous social causes
of terrorism, preferring to view local violence as a product of policies formulated in
some foreign capital.I 66

While it is very important to search for, identify and attempt to ameliorate
or correct the "indigenous social causes of terrorism," the role of the suppliers
of terrorism should not be overlooked. On February 8, 1988, The Washington
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Post reported an interview with Qaddafi by Katherine Graham, chairman of
The Washington Post Company, and correspondents of the Post and Newsweek
under the headline, "Gadhafi: Terrorism is Response to U.S. Policies. "167 The
article stated, inter alia:
Asked about Libyan involvement in supplying weapons to groups that carry out
terrorist actions, Gadhafi did not directly deny such involvement but appeared to defend
it on the grounds that it balanced U.S. intervention elsewhere:
"Why is Reagan involved wi th the contras in Nicaragua, with UNITA in Angola,
with Afghanistan? This is the same question. Let's all agree that everyone concern
himself only with things in his own borders. "168

It is also significant that the political causes of terrorism in the Middle East

include the United States Government's comprehensive military and
economic support for the State ofIsrae1. 169
The Gulf of Sidra is bounded by Libyan territory except for an opening
to the Mediterranean on the north which is approximately ten times the width
of the opening permitted for a "juridical bay" (24 nautical miles or less) under
the jurisdiction of the adjoining state. I7O The Government of Libya has,
nevertheless, claimed that the Gulf of Sidra is a part of its internal waters,
and its principal domestic airline traverses the northern part of the Gulf
between the two largest Libyan cities, Benghazi and Tripoli. Freedom of the
seas in the Gulf of Sidra outside of the 12 mile limit has been successfully
maintained for many years by diplomatic protest 17l and by task forces of small
combatant vessels of the British, French and U.S. Navies. In contrast, from
late January until late March 1986, a 30 ship task force of the U.S. Sixth Fleet
conducted surface and aerial operations in and adjacent to the Gulf of Sidra.
From March 23 until March 26 three carrier battle groups, the Coral Sea, the
Saratoga, and the America, operated in the same area, sinking Libyan missile
boats and downing Libyan fighter aircraft which were claimed to approach
with "hostile intent. "172 The Reagan Administration claimed publicly that
this was a routine maintenance of the right of freedom of navigation, but
accounts in the media stated that it was privately conceded to include a
possible provocation. For example, Messrs. Hoffman and Cannon, writing
in The Washington Post on March 25, 1986 stated:
Although the White House claimed yesterday that the purpose of the naval exercise
was solely to demonstrate freedom of navigation in an international waterway, officials
said privately that the exercise was planned with a realization that it might provoke
a military confrontation with Qaddafi and a chance to underscore Reagan's
determination to deal firmly with international terrorism.173

Previously the exercise of freedom of navigation in this area had not been
provocative because it was maintained by small naval task forces. Such an
exercise can become provocative, however, by using a larger force than that
which is routine and necessary.
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The bombing of the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin which followed
on AprilS, 1986, caused the immediate deaths of a u.s. Army enlisted man
and a young Turkish woman and injury to many others including U.S. military
personnel. On the evening of April 14, the White House issued a statement
that "In light of this reprehensible act of violence and clear evidence that
Libya is planning future attacks, the United States has chosen to exercise its
right of self-defense. "174 In an address to the nation on the same evenmg,
President Reagan stated:
This monstrous brutality is but the latest act in Colonel Qadhafi's reign of terror. The
evidence is now conclusive that the terrorist bombing of La Belle discotheque was
planned and executed under the direct orders of the Libyan regime.... Our evidence
is direct; it is precise; it is irrefutable. We have solid evidence about other attacks Qadhafi
has planned against the U.S. installations and diplomats and even American
tourists .... Self-defense is not only our right, it is our duty.... We Americans are
slow to anger. We always seek peaceful avenues before resorting to the use of forceand we did.t 75

Seymour M. Hersh, an investigative reporter for the New York Times, wrote
in February 1987:
There was widespread concern and anger inside the National Security Agency over the
Administration's handling of the Libyan messages intercepted immediately after the
April 5 terrorist bombing of a West Berlin discotheque. The White House's reliance
on these messages as "irrefutable" evidence that Libya was behind that bombing was
immediately challenged by some allies, most notably West Germany. Some NSA experts
now express similar doubts because the normal intelligence channels for translating and
interpreting such messages were purposely bypassed. As of this month, the NSA's North
African specialists had still not been shown these intercepts.176

As an example of doubts expressed in Western Europe, the German source,
Der Spiegel, published an article in April 1986 entitled "A Complexity of
Findings-Secret Service Dispute Over Libyan Radio Messages. " The article
stated that the "U.S. National Security Agency" and its German equivalent
had reached opposite conclusions as to the meaning of the radio intercepts.
One of its conclusions stated:
Radio messages of such clarity which document a direct responsibility of the Libyan
revolutionary leader Col. Muammar el Ghaddafi for the Berlin bombing were never
recorded.1n

Mr. Hersh, in the article quoted above, also stated:
William J. Casey, then Director of Central Intelligence, personally served as the
intelligence officer for a secret task force on Libya set up in mid-1981, and he provided
intelligence that could not be confirmed by his subordinates. Some task force members
suspected that much of Casey's information, linking Qaddafi to alleged "hit teams" that
were said to be targeting President Reagan and other senior White House aides, was
fabricated by him.t 78

In early 1986 a report, entitled Libya Under Qadhafi: A Pattern of Aggression
and covering alleged Libyan terrorism through the December 1985 attacks
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at the Rome and Vienna airports, set forth the State Department's
understanding of the facts:
The main targets of direct Libyan terrorist activities have been expatriate Libyan
dissidents and leading officials of moderate Arab and African governments.179

The report also states that these att~cks have taken place in many coU:ntries
and that Libya has planned anti-exile attacks in the United States, but only
one example is provided. 180 There is a "Chronology of Libyan Support for
Terrorism 1980-85//181 in the report which lists a total of 58 incidents, but only
eight were alleged to involve direct action by Libya and of these none were
stated to be directed against United States nationals. Two of the others
referred to Libyan armed forces actions against Chad and one referred to
the August 1981 incident in which two Libyan SU-22s were shot down by
U.S. Navy aircraft. Some of the incidents appear to be based upon hearsay
evidence which would not be admissible in a law court, although some are
consistent with possible Libyan support for terrorism. A more recent State
Department report issued in 1989182 accuses Libya of "Reaching for
Respectability"183 and of conducting a "Drive for Influence, "184 but neither
is in violation of international law and both are activities of most national
states. The report contains a "Chronology of Libyan Support for Terrorism,
1986-1988//185 with many of the incidents reported stated to be "believed" or
"suspected." Like the earlier report, this one contains some statements which
are consistent with possible Libyan support for terrorism.
In summary, the State Department reports fail to produce factual evidence
of direct Libyan terrorism against United States nationals, and the information
provided concerning Libyan support for terrorism is equivocal. Consequently,
the Reagan Administration's claims against the Libyan Government are not
substantiated by the State Department's reports.
The Vice President's Report on combating terrorism issued in early 1986
refers to "the uncovering of a pro-Qaddafi conspiracy to carry out three
assassinations and to bomb strategic locations in the United States"186 by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1985. The Report contains no details on
this subject and the only other reference to Libya reports that Qaddafi stated
that Libyans will attack "American citizens in their own streets. "187 If this
were to happen, it would be within domestic jurisdiction and police power.
Concerning international responses to terrorism, the Report states, inter alia:
Political or economic sanctions directed against sponsoring states offer the least direct
danger to lives and property and are more likely than military force to gain international
support.1 ss

The United States has used such economic sanctions against Libya and has
applied the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. 189
On April 14, 1986 the twelve ministers of foreign affairs of the European
community issued an announcement at The Hague which stated, inter alia:
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The Twelve have decided to act according to the following lines regarding Libya and,
where necessary, regarding other states clearly implicated in supporting terrorism:
-

restrictions on the freedom of movement of diplomatic and consular personnel;

-

reduction of the staff of diplomatic and consular missions;

-

stricter visa requirements and procedures. l90

The announcement added that no arms or other military equipment will be
exported to Libya and that further measures will be considered as necessary.
The Western Economic Summit meeting in Tokyo, May 4-6, 1986 issued
"Declarations and statements by the seven Heads of State of Government
and the representatives of the European Communities. "191 Concerning
international terrorism, it was stated, inter alia:
\Ve specify the following as measures open to any government concerned to deny to
international terrorists the opportunity and the means to carry out their aims, and to
identify and deter those who perpetrate such terrorism. We have decided to apply these
measures within the framework of international law and in our own jurisdictions in
respect of any state which is clearly involved in sponsoring or supporting international
terrorism, and in particular of Libya, until such time as the state concerned abandons
its complicity in, or support for, such terrorism.t 92

The "measures" included refusal to export arms, strict limits on the size of
diplomatic missions, denial of entry to suspected persons including diplomatic
personnel, improved extradition procedures, stricter immigration and visa
requirements, and close bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
A negotiating history of the Tokyo Summit which appeared in the New
York Times 193 stated that the specific mention of Libya was a last minute change
inserted by the Summit leaders after the final draft declaration was presented
to them. The European position was reported to be that terrorism could only
be combatted effectively by understanding that it arose from legitimate
political grievances but, nevertheless, the final text included the declaration
that "terrorism has no justification. "194 An informal working paper stated
to have been prepared by staff members of the United- States delegation
conceded that one thing which might well motivate other countries to fight
terrorism "is the need to do something so that the crazy Americans won't
take matters into their own hands again. "195
Whatever the motivations, it is clear that the European community's
official position is that state supported terrorism exists and that Libya is one
offender. Nothing in the community's position, however, provides support
for military as opposed to economic and diplomatic sanctions. The New York
Times reported that President Reagan stated on April 21, 1986, that President
Mitterrand of France privately suggested that the United States make an allout military attack against Libya,196 This is not consistent with the French
President's public position denying overflight rights for the aircraft flying
from the United Kingdom to Libya. Apparently the Reagan Administration
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did plan a comprehensive military attack upon Libya to be effectuated in
cooperation with Egypt. An article in The Washington Post of April 2, 1986,
by Bob Woodward stated, under the headline "u .S. Unable to Persuade Egypt
to Back Plan for Joint Anti-Qaddafi Move":
Eight months of secret U.S. efforts to win Egyptian approval for a U.S.-Egyptian
military operation designed to overthrow Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi appear to
have foundered following public disclosure and rejection of the plan by Cairo, informed
sources said yesterday.l97

2. Application of the International Law Requirements for SelfDefense
The same three basic requirements considered in the analysis of the Cuban
Missile Crisis are applicable. 19S They are: the use of peaceful procedures if
possible; actual necessity for defense of the national state against an existing
armed aggression or an imminent one; and proportionality in responding
defensive measures.
The media reported on the Libyan attempts to use peaceful procedures and
the United States reaction. Fo; example, two weeks before the U.S. bombing
attacks, David H. Ottaway reported on the Libyan attempts to open
diplomatic discussions with the U.S. Government:
In advance of Vice President Bush's trip to Saudi Arabia, Libyan leader Muammar
Qaddafi sent two emissaries to Riyadh in an apparent attempt once again to open a
dialogue with Washington in the wake of the U.S.-Libyan confrontation last week in
the Gulf of Sidra.
Administration officials said they had no intention of responding to Qaddafi's latest
overture through the Saudis. They added that they have also rebuffed half a dozen other
attempts by Libya to make contact with the United States through various European
and Arab channels following the December 27 terrorist attacks on the Rome and Vienna
airports ....
The )Vould-be European and Arab mediators, including King Fahd himself, were
firmly told in January that the administration was not interested either in "a direct or
indirect dialogue" with Qaddafi, according to the sources. l99

The Ottaway article also reports:
The administration has also told various would-be mediators that it is not interested
in striking any "deal" with Qaddafi whereby the Libyan leader would promise to end
terrorist attacks against U.S. interests in return for improved relations with the United
States, the official said....
In addition to King Fahd, Qaddafi also tried in January to enlist the support of the
leaders of Greece, Austria, Malta, Italy and Morocco to open a dialogue with
Washington.200

Unfortunately, it is necessary to conclude from the events summarized that
the Reagan Administration failed to take advantage of the several
opportunities presented to it for peaceful resolution of the controversy in spite
of President Reagan's statement to the contrary.201 Consequently, the United
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States Government failed to comply with the first requirement to justify a
claim of self-defense.
The second requirement of the law of self-defense is that there be an
existing armed aggression against the United States or an imminent one which
is reasonably anticipated in the near future. 202 The entire law of national selfdefense has been developed to protect a national state from armed aggression
or an imminent threat of such aggression to its most basic values including
its continued national existence and independence. Other legal doctrines,
including the recognized right of a state to take limited measures to protect
its nationals abroad, have been developed to deal with lesser injuries.203 The
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor provides an example of a then-existing armed
aggression against the United States. An example of a reasonably anticipated
imminent armed aggression is the threat to the United States from the
clandestine attempted emplacement of Soviet inter-continental missiles with
nuclear capability in Cuba.
Both of these examples involved action by major military powers which
was directed at the United States as a national entity. In contrast, the claims
of President Reagan set forth above204 refer to injury or threatened injury
from a state which has a trivial military capacity in comparison with that
of the United States and only concern alleged past and future attacks on
individual U.S. citizens rather than the United States as a whole. If a basis
for the claim of self-defense can be the probability of future Libyan terrorism,
then one is forced to consider possible future acts which are much harder
to ascertain than the alleged unclear past events. In evaluating past events,
even if it were assumed that Libya was responsible for the bombing at the
La Belle discotheque, the attack on Benghazi and Tripoli several days later
could not be self-defense to that bombing as an imminent threat. 205
The determination of whether or not Libyan actions constituted a
meaningful threat to the United States should also consider the role of other
states in activities termed "terrorism." George C. Wilson and Fred Hiatt,
writing on March 26, 1986, stated that:

u.s. intelligence showed that Iran and Syria probably were more involved in the recent
acts of terrorism, but those countries were not the visible symbols of evil that Qaddafi
presented. A demonstration of U.S. resolve was necessary and Libya was singled out.206

The persistence of such reports was reflected in an interview with Secretary
of State Shultz. Lesley Stahl interviewed the Secretary on CBS-TV's "Face
the Nation" on January 12, 1986:
Q. There are reports now that investigators in Europe believe that the terrorists who
perpetrated the bombing in Rome and Vienna did not come from training camps in
Libya, but came from camps in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley, and then came
through Syria into Europe. Are there second thoughts within our government about
just exactly how much Libya is to blame for this latest terrorist act?207
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Secretary Shultz replied, in part, "No. Libya is clearly supporting terrorism
in general." In the balance of a long answer he did not mention Syria. The
questioner persisted:
Q. Now, what about Syrian involvement? Just how much is that government
responsible?
A. Syria's picture is a rather different one. I would remind you that Syria has long
been on our terrorist list, but Syria's behavior toward all of these things is rather different
from Libya's.
Q. In what sense? How is it different?
A. In their public attitudes, and because we are working with Syria on a number of
fronts in a constructive way.208

In Secretary Shultz' news conference on January 9, 1986, he was asked a
question about the Iranian role:
Q. Why the narrow focus on Libya when our own intelligence community has singled
out Iran, for example, as a country that trains terrorists, a country that has taken
American lives over the past several years in places like Lebanon? Why the lashing out
on this one subject and not tackling the others?
A. Libya is a country that has been, is, and no doubt will continue to be involved in
terrorist activities .... Insofar as Iran is concerned, we are as concerned anywhere
about terrorist activities. We are talking about Libya in this instance. We have very
little trade with Iran ....w

Secretary Shultz did not state that the "little trade" he referred to was
principally the Reagan Administration's then secret weapons shipments to
Iran. 210 The supply of weapons to Iran, of course, made it unrealistic to treat
that country as Libya was being treated. There were also compelling reasons
to treat Syria differently. During the Israeli armed attack on the Palestine
Liberation Organization and Lebanon in 1982, Israel attacked and destroyed
a large part of the Syrian Air Force and the Syrian air defense system.
Thereafter, the Soviet Union reinforced its ties with Syria and rebuilt the
air defense system. 211 The result was that in 1986 Syria possessed a much more
significant defense system than it did in 1982 and an attack on Syria would
be much more costly to the attacker than would an attack on Libya. In addition
to other reasons, Libya was apparently selected for its military weakness
which made it a less credible threat to the United States than either Iran or
Syria.
While it is not unlawful to select a weak target in order to minimize
casualties to one's own forces, the matter must also be evaluated in terms
of the proportionality of probable ancillary civilian casualties. It is impossible
to support the finding of President Reagan in his Executive Order ofJanuary
7, 1986, that the Government of Libya constitutes "an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United
States. "212 There was simply no threat to the national security, and if there
were a threat to foreign policy, it would not justify responding military
measures. Because of these considerations, it is impossible to conclude that
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the United States complied with the legal requirement of an existing or
imminently anticipated armed aggression against it.
The third essential element of a valid claim of national self-defense is
proportionality in responding measures. Because of the failure to use available
peaceful procedures and the absence of actual necessity, it would be
unnecessary to consider the issue of proportionality. Even if the first two
requirements for self-defense had been met, there is considerable doubt that
the intense use of military coercion in a responding bombing attack could
be appraised as proportional. One reason for this doubt is that following the
bombing attacks it became clear that the United States had killed and injured
many more Libyans (both civilian and military personnel with no indication
that any of the victims were involved in any acts of terrorism) than the number
of Americans that Libya was accused of either killing or providing support
for their killing.
U.S. Navy Regulations, which are routinely treated as law in many contexts
including court martial proceedings, are issued by the Secretary of the Navy
following the approval of the President.213 Article 0915 entitled "Use of Force
Against Another State" provides in relevant part:
The right of self-defense must be exercised only as a last resort, and then only to the
extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required.
Force must never be used with a view to inflicting punishment for acts already
committed. 214

In summary, it is very difficult to find legal support for the Reagan
Administration's claim that the bombing attack is justified as self-defense.
3. Application of the International Law of Reprisal
It is sometimes suggested that the law of self-defense is inadequate to
provide protection against contemporary acts and threats of terrorism and
that the law concerning reprisals is more relevant. 215 The traditional law on
the subject has three requirements for an act of reprisal to be justified: (1)
a response to a violation of international law; (2) an unsatisfied demand for
termination of the violation; and (3) a proportion between the original
violation and the act of the reprisal. 216 There is some evidence that there may
have been a violation of international law by Libyan support for terrorism,
and apparently the Reagan Administration carried out the bombing on the
basis that the original violation had not been terminated, although they did
not at any time claim that the raids were reprisals. The most serious difficulty
with application of the law of reprisal is the third requirement of
proportionality.
The Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons (1949)217
prohibits reprisals against protected civilian persons. In addition, the wellestablished customary law prohibits attacks upon civilians. It is clear that the
United States bombing attacks were not directed at civilians as such.
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Nevertheless, it must have been apparent that the selection of claimed military
targets in such close proximity to civilian residences and the French Embassy
presented the gravest danger to civilians. The results of the bombing in civilian
casualties raise substantial doubt as to whether the requirement of
proportionality for reprisals was met.
4. Application of the Law of Targeting
The failure of the claim of self-defense and the serious doubts concerning
justification as reprisal mean that there is no clear legal authority for attacking
Libyan objectives. It is essential, nevertheless, to examine the bombing attacks
under the criteria of the law of targeting.
The operational plan for the bombing of Libya was termed EI Dorado
Canyon. Because of the denial of over-flight rights by European countries,
except Great Britain, the Air Force F-111 aircraft from Lakenheath Air Base
in England flew around the west coast of the Iberian Peninsula, entering the
Mediterranean at the Strait of Gibraltar, and after repeated refuelings,
attacked targets in Tripoli. The Navy aircraft from the carriers attacked
targets in Benghazi.
There were five targets specified for the bombing attack: (1) Benina air
field at Benghazi where some Libyan military aircraft were on the ground;
(2) Benghazi Barracks-the site of Qaddafi's alternate headquarters and
command post; (3) Tripoli International Airport where some Libyan military
transport aircraft were on the ground; (4) Sidi Bilal military facility in
Tripoli-claimed to be a terrorist training school (Libya claimed that it is
a school for naval cadets); and (5) Azziziyah compound in Tripoli-Qaddafi's
main headquarters and his family's home. 218 Following interviews over a
period of three months with more than 70 of the officials planning the attack,
Seymour Hersh concludes that Col. Qaddafi was the primary target. 219
Qaddafi was not hit, but Hersh reports concerning his family:
All eight of Qaddafi's children, as well as his wife, Safiya, were hospitalized, suffering
from shock and various injuries. His 15-month-old adopted daughter, Hanna, died several
hours after the raid.22/)

President Reagan's executive order number 12,333, section 2.11, entitled
"Prohibition on Assassination" states that "No person employed by or acting
on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to
engage in, assassination. "221 Referring to this order in the context of the
Libyan attacks, and particularly the bombing of the Qaddafi family living
quarters, one commentator stated:
If the raid was in fact a veiled execution attempt, it would pit the Reagan Administration
against a specific presidential order and substantial legal precedent. In 1976, after public
discontent over the revelations of CIA assassination attempts in Chile, Guatemala and
Iran, President Ford issued an Executive Order forbidding the Government from
authorizing the assassination of world leaders. Both Presidents Carter and Reagan have
reaffirmed that ban.222
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Aviation Week & Space Technology reported under the headline, "U.S.
Demonstrates Advanced Weapons Technology in Libya," that a senior
military official stated shortly after the attack:
"Understandably, after the all-Navy action in Libya last month, the Air Force wanted
a piece of the action." The official added, "The fact that the Defense Dept. budget
is under consideration-and here was an opportunity to show how well the money is
being spent on aircraft and weapons-was not overlooked by both services as a side
benefit to the mission. Another reason to include the F-l11s in the operation was that
it showed the support of Great Britain for our antiterrorist activities. ''223

At his joint press conference with Secretary Shultz the evening of April
14, 1986, Secretary of Defense Weinberger said in his introductory comment:
We used a combination of SOO-pound and 2,OOO-pound laser-guided weapons and
precision-guided delayed gravity bombs. All of the Navy planes have returned without
casualty. All of the F-ll1s with one exception, have been accounted for and are
returning.... The attack was carried out precisely as planned, and it was, as the
President said, evidence of very great skill, both navigational as well as the organization
of the attack which was a difficult one from the professional point of view and done
with great effectiveness....224

During the ensuing question period, the following took place:
Q. There was also a report that you hit part of the French Embassy in Libya. Do you
know anything about that report?
A. Secretary Weinberger. That would be, I think, virtually impossible.225

David Blundy and Andrew Lycett, have reported on both the rules of
engagement and the civilian casualties.226
The rules of engagement for Operation Eldorado Canyon had been strictly
formulated, or so it was claimed in the official U.S. explanation to the British Cabinet:
the planes should strike only targets that could be precisely defined and shown to be
related to terrorist and military activity. The weapons officer in each plane had to have
a 'double lock-on' before he could release his bombs, which meant that he had to fix
the target, not only with his forward looking infra-red night sight, but also with his
Pave Track radar. Any plane which failed to achieve this was under orders to leave
the target area and jettison its bombs over the sea ....
At least a dozen bombs and missiles fell in the area of Bin Ashur a [suburb of Tripoli],
making craters ten feet deep, knocking out the front of an apartment building and scoring
direct hits on private villas. The house next to the French embassy was destroyed and
the embassy itself severely damaged. One bomb or missile landed in the center of a
park and children's playground. A child's foot was sticking out of the rubble of one
building. The body of an old man was fixed in a crouch as if he had been getting out
of bed when the bombs hit. Another old man lay on a stretcher outside his villa, killed
by falling rubble. It was a gruesome sight.227

In another account, David C. Martin and John Walcott report similar civilian
damage and conclude that: "Measured by the bomb-damage assessment, the
raid was less than impressive."228 The newspapers reported various
inaccuracies in the bombing. For example, Edward Schumacher, reported in
the New York Times:

284

Law of Naval Operations

More than a dozen bombs and missiles from the American air raids early Tuesday appear
to have missed an air base and hit two farms about two miles away according to evidence
seen by reporters on visits to the farms today.229

Unfortunately, aerial bombardment even with the most advanced technology
remains a very blunt instrument. Operational planners of "surgical strikes,"
employing "pin-point accuracy," and "precision delivered munitions,"
should recognize that results consistent with such plans are seldom manifested
in an actual bombardment.
Even though there was no prior armed conflict between the United States
and Libya, the armed attack brought into effect the law of armed conflict.
Ever since the Prize Cases,230 decided by the U.S. Supreme Court during the
Civil War, the law of armed conflict has been applicable to the fact of an
international armed conflict including episodes of hostilities without requiring
a so-called technical state of war. Therefore, Hague Convention (IX)
Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War (1907),231 is
applicable to the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi. It prohibits bombing of
undefended locations, and military targets in Tripoli and Benghazi were
defended even though the Libyan defenses were weak in comparison with
the military technology and the weight of the ordnance employed against
them. Article 6 of the Convention provides:
If the military situation permits, the commander of the attacking naval force, before
commencing the bombardment, must do his utmost to warn the authorities.

In the bombardment of the Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf,
considered previously,232 prior notice was given so that the personnel would
evacuate the platform. In the attacks on Tripoli and Benghazi a probable
objective was to kill Libyan personnel alleged to be involved in terrorist
training activities and so no warning was given. In view of the ambiguous
language concerning "[i]f the military situation permits," it is not clear that
Hague Convention IX required a warning. The unfortunate result, however,
in addition to the killing of Libyan military personnel who possibly had no
connection with terrorism, was the killing of a substantial number of
civilians.233
The Navy Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations ("NWP 9")
under the heading "Incidental Injury and Collateral Damage" provides the
legal criteria of the well-established customary international law:
It is not unlawful to cause incidental injury or death to civilians, or collateral damage
to civilian objects, during an attack upon a legitimate military objective. Incidental
injury or collateral damage should not, however, be excessive in light of the military
advantage anticipated by the attack. Naval commanders must take all practicable
precautions, taking into account military and humanitarian considerations, to keep
civilian casualties and damage to the absolute minimum consistent with mission
accomplishment and the security of the force. 234
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This legal standard is easier to apply in an on-going international conflict
than it is to the attacks on Tripoli and Benghazi. The first difficulty here
is to determine whether the military objectives which were targeted
constituted "a legitimate military objective." It is also difficult to identify
the lawful "military advantage" which was anticipated by this attack.
Consequently, it is impossible to relate incidental "injury or collateral
damage" to civilian persons or objects to such a "military advantage." Rather
than seeking military advantage in the attack, the stated objective of the
Reagan Administration was to deter claimed Libyan terrorism against U.S.
citizens and the hard fact remained that no such direct terrorism was credibly
proven to exist either before or after the bombing attack.235
A State Department "Fact Sheet" entitled Libya's Qaddafi Continues Support
for Terrorism contains charges against Libya for the years 1986-1988.236 It states
Qaddafi conducts terrorism against Libyan dissidents237 and that Libya's
foreign policy and diplomatic objectives are inconsistent with those of the
United States.238 It includes a "Chronology of Libyan Support for Terrorism
1986-1988," which details thirty incidents in which "Libyan involvement"
was often stated to be "suspected" but without a single incident involving
a direct Libyan attack on U.S. citizens, although several attacks conducted
by others against U.S. citizens or interests are stated to be supported by Libya
but without any evidence.239 Of the thirty incidents, four are listed as involving
"Americans. " Concerning the bombing at the La Belle discotheque, the "Fact
Sheet" states: "The U.S. Government announced it had direct evidence of
Libyan complicity in the attack. "240 There can be no question but that this
was "announced," but the evidence of complicity is, on the most favorable
view, equivocal. Of course, it is possible that there was secret evidence which
cannot be considered in this analysis. 241
In summary, even if there had been clear legal authority to bomb Benghazi
and Tripoli, and full acknowledgment is accorded to the tactical effort to
engage only in "precision bombing," the results achieved in the killing of
civilians probably violate the law. The existence of ancillary civilian casualties
which occur as a result of the lawful targeting of military objectives is not
unlawful. The key issue concerns proportionality. On the basis of the
information about the attacks on Benghazi and Tripoli, it is not possible to
conclude with assurance that the customary law standard of avoiding
excessive, that is, disproportionate, injury or death to civilians was met by
the targeting. 242

Authors' Postscript Concerning Subsequent Possible Evidence of
Libyan Involvement in the Bombing of LaBelle Discotheque
Since the completion of the text on this subject there have been some
references in the media to possible Libyan involvement in the bombing. Most
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of the reports indicate that some agents of the former East German secret
police, "Stasi", state the existence of a Libyan connection. Among the
examples are accoun~s in Time magazine of July 23, 1990 ("World Notes"
at p. 54, cols. 1-2), the Washington Post of June 21, 1990 (p. A27, cols. 4-5
cont. at p. A30, col. 1) and the New York Times of July 15, 1990 (p. 6, cols.
1-6) and July 28,1990 (p. A4, cols. 4-5).
Two facts must be established to provide legal justification for the military
response by the Reagan Administration. The first is unequivocal evidence of
significant Libyan involvement. The second is equally unequivocal evidence
of knowledge of this before the decision to respond militarily was made. Since
most of the reports emanate from the former Stasi, this would require that
the Reagan Administration was privy to Stasi sources.
In the event that both were to be established, significant major issues
concerning the law of self-defense and of targeting would remain.

VI. The Basic Principles of the Law of Naval Targeting
It is now practicable to set forth the contemporary rules oflaw concerning
naval targeting based upon the development of the customary law in the
W orld Wars and subsequently and upon the treaty law including the London
Protocol (1936) and Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea (1949). Because the law applies equally to surface and submarine
warships and military aircraft, a single set of basic rules may be formulated.
The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (NWP 9) adopts a
different approach by setting forth separate targeting rules for "Surface
Warfare, "243 "Submarine Warfare "244 and" Air Warfare at Sea. "245 Although
the rules are substantially similar, the separate treatment is apparently
designed to indicate that different weapons platforms operate in distinct
tactical environments.
The general principles of the law ofarmed conflict are, of course, applicable
to naval targeting. In addition to the basic principles of military necessity
and humanity conceived as a single principle of avoiding unnecessary
destruction of human and material values,246 and the Martens Clause247 which
specifies that when the situation is not covered by an existing rule the parties
to the conflict remain bound by the customary international law and the usages
established by the community of states, the following are applicable:
1. The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited.
2. It is prohibited to direct attacks against the civilian population as such.
3. The basic distinction between combatants and non-combatants must be
made.248
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A. Enemy Warships and Military Aircraft
Enemy warships and military aircraft (including naval and military
auxiliaries) may lawfully be the objects of attack, destruction, or capture
anywhere outside of neutral territory. Since such warships and aircraft are
valuable military assets, their capture is always desirable if tactically possible.
It is unlawful to refuse quarter to an enemy attempting to surrender in good
faith. 249 When an enemy warship has clearly indicated the intention to
surrender by hauling down its flag or hoisting a white flag, or by stopping
engines, or by responding to the attacker's directions, or by taking to lifeboats,
or in any other manner, the attack must be stopped. In many tactical situations
a submarine indicates surrender by coming to the surface. Manifestation of
surrender by an aircraft is especially difficult. However, if a good faith offer
to surrender is made, it must be accepted. One such manifestation would be
a willingness to land the aircraft in the territory of the attacker. It is not
necessary to formally adjudicate the transfer of title of a captured enemy
warship' or military aircraft since such ownership vests immediately in the
captor's government by the act of capture.250
B. Enemy Merchant Vessels and Civilian Aircraft and Neutral Merchant Vessels
and Civilian Aircraft which are Participating in the Enemy Armed Conflict Effort
Such merchant vessels and civilian aircraft are valuable assets and should
be captured if possible whenever they are located outside of neutral territory.
The use of visit and search is not required if identification of status can be
made by electronic or other means. If the military situation following a
capture prevents the sending or taking in of such a vessel or aircraft for
adjudication, it may be destroyed after adequate measures are taken for the
safety of crew and passengers.251 All documents and papers relating to the
captured vessels or aircraft should be safeguarded and each case of destruction
should be reported promptly to higher command.252 If capture is militarily
impracticable, the vessel or aircraft may be attacked and destroyed if it falls
under one of the following categories:253

1. Refusing to stop or follow directions upon being ordered to do so;
2. Actively resisting visit and search or capture;
3. Sailing under convoy of enemy warships or enemy military aircraft;
4. If incorporated into or assisting the intelligence system of the enemy
armed forces;
5. If acting as a naval or military auxiliary to the enemy armed forces;
6. If participating in the enemy war effort. 254
C. Certain Enemy and Neutral Merchant Vessels and Civil Aircraft Which are
Immune from Attack
The characterization of particular merchant vessels and civil aircraft as
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"enemy" does not, without more, make them lawful objects of attack. Neutral
merchant vessels and civil aircraft comprise two distinct categories: those
participating in and those not participating in the enemy war effort. 255 The
following categories of vessels and aircraft are immune from attack:
1. Enemy merchant vessels and civil aircraft which are not participating
directly in the enemy armed conflict effort;
Example: Such a vessel or aircraft which is away from the main area of combat
operations in a location where visit and search, electronic or other identification, or
orders to land may be employed.

2. Neutral merchant vessels and civil aircraft which are not participating
in the enemy armed conflict effort;
Example: A neutral merchant ship or civil aircraft engaged in genuine inter-neutral
trade or the transportation of civilian passengers.

3. Vessels and aircraft designated for and engaged in the exchange of
prisoners (cartel vessels);
4. Vessels and aircraft guaranteed safe conduct by agreement of the parties
to the conflict;
5. Properly designated and marked hospital ships, medical transports, and
medical aircraft;
6. Vessels and civil aircraft engaged in philanthropic or non-military
scientific missions;
7. Small coastal fishing boats and small boats engaged in local coastal trade.
Such boats are subject to reasonable order of the naval commander in control
of the area as, for example, an order to depart from the immediate area of
combat operations.256

D. Naval Bombardment
"Bombardmen~" is used here to refer to naval bombardment by surface
or submarine warships or by naval or military aircraft of enemy targets on
land. All contemporary methods of bombardment including gunfire, rockets,
missiles, and bombs are included. Prior to the World Wars, bombardment
of shore objects by naval gunfire was an incident of many armed conflicts.
It was employed again in both World Wars, and from 1939 to 1945 naval
gunfire was used as the spearhead of Allied amphibious operations. The basic
rules of naval targeting considered above are also applicable here.257
The United States is a party to Hague Convention (IX) Concerning
Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War (1907).258 Its article 1(1)
provides: "The bombardment by naval forces of undefended ports, towns,
villages, dwellings, or buildings is forbidden." Article 2 states that military
objectives, even in undefended locations, are not immunized from naval
bombardment. Although aviation was in a primitive stage of development
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in 1907, this Hague Convention applies comprehensively to bombardment and
therefore includes aerial bombardment. Of course, the customary law rule
of proportionality, that incidental civilian casualties and damage must be
limited to that which is proportional to the military advantage to be expected
from the attack, is applicable to naval bombardment as it is to all armed
conflict. Consequently, the deliberate or wanton destruction of areas of
concentrated civilian habitation is prohibited.
The parties to a conflict may immunize particular demilitarized zones by
specific agreement. Medical personnel and facilities are always immunized
unless they are used in violation of law for military purposes. It is also well
established customary law that buildings devoted to religious, cultural and
charitable purposes are not lawful objects of attack.259 The following rules
are based upon customary law and the established practices of the community
of states, portions of which have been codified in treaties:
1. Bombardment for the purpose of terrorizing the civilian population is
prohibited.
2. The wanton or deliberate destruction of areas of civilian habitation
including cities, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings is prohibited.
3. A demilitarized zone agreed to by the parties to the conflict is exempt
from bombardment.
4. Medical facilities including medical establishments and units, medical
vehicles, equipment and stores may not be made the objects of bombardment.
The distinctive medical emblem, either a red cross, a red crescent or the red
lion and sun, should be clearly displayed in order to facilitate immunity. Any
object identified otherwise as a medical facility is also immune from
bombardment even if it is not marked with the protective symbol.
5. Hospital zones established by agreement of the parties to the conflict
are Immune.
6. All religious, cultural or charitable facilities or buildings are not lawful
objects ofbombardment. 260 The distinctive emblem to protect such facilities
or buildings is a rectangle divided diagonally into two triangular halves with
the upper portion black and the lower portion white.261 Any object identified
otherwise as such a facility is also immune from bombardment even if it is
not marked with the protective symbol.
7. It is prohibited to bomb installations which if destroyed would release
forces harmful to the civilian population if the probable harm to civilians
would be excessive in relation to the military advantage to be achieved by
bombardment. Such installations include nuclear and other power plants as
well as dams, dikes, and similar objects. 262
8. Whenever the military situation permits, commanders are obligated to
make every effort to warn the civilian population located in proximity to
a military objective which is the target of bombardment. Warnings should
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be specific, if possible, but a general warning is permissible if a more specific
one would jeopardize the mission of the bombarding force. 263

E. Enforcement of the Law
The law of targeting illustrates the practicality of the law of armed conflict,
promoting military efficiency by designating military personnel and objects
as lawful targets while minimizing unnecessary destruction of human and
material values through prohibiting attacks on civilian persons and objects.
The basic principles of the law of naval targeting have remained constant
while being applied to changing technology including the development of
submarines, aircraft and nuclear weapons. These principles apply to
contemporary over-the-horizon weapons systems which must be employed
, so as to protect civilian persons and objects from disproportionate ancillary
casualties and damage. A thoughtful naval historian has recently concluded
that future armed conflict at sea will be conducted almost exclusively under
water by diverse types of submarine warships.264
It is sometimes suggested that a law of armed conflict of ideal doctrinal
content would emphasize the principle of humanity over considerations of
military necessity. Such a law would break down in actual practice and would
be much less effective in protecting human and material values than the
existing law which takes account of the full range of legitimate military
interests. A basic sanction of the law of armed conflict is the common selfinterest of the participants that more is to be gained by adhering to the law
than by violating it. There is also an important element of reciprocity and
mutuality in observance.26s The alternative to enforcement of the law is not
only the unnecessary destruction of human and material values in armed
conflict, but a chaotic international system which requires the entire world
community to live under the threat of impending nuclear disaster.
The United States has, throughout its history with few exceptions, been
a leader in the development and enforcement of international law including
the law of armed conflict. Because military necessity has been taken into
account in formulating the legal rules such claimed necessity cannot be
invoked as a device to repeal or modify them. It is not possible to ascertain
a military advantage, much less a military necessity, in four of the examples
considered in this study: the bombing of a submarine engaged in rescue
operations, the killings following the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, the
prohibition of North Korean coastal fishing, and the April 1986 bombing of
Libya.
In spite of these instances, the United States Government, and the Navy,
as well as the other Armed Services, continue to emphasize the importance
of the entire law of armed conflict and the key enforcement role of line
officers. The mandatory instructions requiring observance of the law, the
manuals explaining the law, including the legally accurate and militarily
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practical Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations,266 and the
reliance on officers of the Judge Advocate General's Corps who are specialists
in international law all facilitate the line officer's role.
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